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ABSTRACT 
SSR/IFF interrogator signal processors are typically required to identify replies 
from up to 1500 target transponders per antenna rotation. 
A real live test involving such a large number of targets would be extremely 
expensive, and difficult to repeat. There is thus a need for specialized target 
emulators to be developed and used as laboratory test equipment. 
This thesis describes the design and implementation of a transistor-transistor-
logic (TTL) real-time SSRlIFF target emulator. User requirements that 
describe the system are captured and analyzed, resulting in the generation of 
a system breakdown structure; a summary of the relevant concepts and 
requirements allocation process for each subsystem is presented, in order to 
produce a technical specification for the system. 
The developed target emulator runs on the Innovative Integration Quixote 
board, and is capable of generating SSRlIFF replies for modes 1, 2, 3/A, C 
and secure mode 4 from up to 4000 emulated mobile targets at ranges from 0 
to 600km. On the Quixote, a Xilinx Virtexll FPGA implements real-time 
aspects of the design, while target configuration information is continuously 
maintained by a Texas Instruments TMS320C6416 DSP for each antenna 
rotation. Emulated target configuration parameters are fully reconfigurable on-
the-fly in terms of range, azimuth and reply codes in order to allow the user to 
create numerous test scenarios. 
The operation of the target emulator has been verified against all design 
requirements, and it has been found to be compliant. The verification was 
performed using co-simulation and on-target testing methods. The Quixote 
board is a suitable HW platform for the system; however, it has been 
recommended that a lower cost board should be used in the future. 
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1. Chapter 1: Introduction 
The aim of this thesis is to describe the design, implementation and testing of 
a digital, real-time Secondary Surveillance Radar/Identification Friend or Foe 
(SSRlIFF) target emulator. This emulator has been designed to test and 
debug an SSR/IFF interrogator digital signal processor, and is intended for 
use in a laboratory setting. The design of the target emulator also provides a 
foundation for the future development of SSR/IFF equipment. 
Once the target emulator has been set up and interrogated by an interrogator, 
it is capable of generating STANAG-4193 [2] digital TTL timing complaint 
SSRlIFF replies simultaneously from thousands of simulated mobile targets. 
These targets are equipped with SSR/IFF transponders and cryptographic 
computers, each with distinct, user defined reply codes for modes 1, 2, 3/A, C 
and secure mode 4. The emulator will also have the ability to generate SSR 
emergency and Special Position Indicator (SPI) responses. 
The target emulator is able to interface with a SSR/IFF antenna or to emulate 
the azimuth pulse behaviour of an idle SSRlIFF antenna, if an antenna is not 
present. Emulated targets can be scattered within a 360 0 panoramic view, all 
in correspondence to the antenna azimuth pulses. 
The target emulator is designed to test the ability of an interrogator signal 
processor to identify the emulated targets correctly, as well as to de-garble 
overlapped replies and to de-correlate Friendly Replies Unsynchronized in 
Time (FRUIT) properly. It is also designed to test whether the interrogator will 
correctly decode and assign replies to targets on the interrogator display. The 
target emulator carries out these tests while creating a continuous live testing 
environment for the user, in the sense that the user is given the option to alter 
interrogation parameters on-the-fly, i.e. target locations and ranges, target 
mobility behaviour, and FRUIT interrogators' interrogation modes, without the 
need to stop or pause the emulator. 
A significant portion of the design and implementation was done using VHDL 
co-simulation techniques, which makes allowance for mixing and integration 
of Matlab/Simulink [11] blocks with C code running in the Matlab/Simulink 
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environment, and with VHDL code running in Modelsim [10], which are all 
controlled by Matlab/Simulink. 
1.1 5SRlIFF Background 
In primary radar, a reasonably high powered pulse is transmitted through 
space towards a target. The radar then detects the presence of that target 
when a part of the energy is reflected back from the target's surface. The 
radar is also able to calculate the target's range by measuring the time from 
the transmission of the pulse to the time the reflection is received [1]. In 
Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) the purpose is neither to detect the 
presence of the target nor to determine its position accurately, but rather to 
identify the target positively and to distinguish it from other targets. 
In order for a target to be identified, it must be equipped with a special 
transceiver known as an SSR transponder, which receives coded pulses of 
energy at a frequency of 1030 MHz. Together, these pulses form what are 
known as "interrogations" or "challenges", which are generated by an SSR 
interrogator. After processing an interrogation, the transponder replies by 
transmitting coded pulses containing identification information at a frequency 
of 1090 MHz. The interrogator receives a reply and interprets it, before 
passing the result to a display system in the simplest application, or to a larger 
command and control system. 
SSR is currently being used in the military and in civilian Air Traffic Control 
(ATC) systems. In the military, the need to identify friendly aircrafts positively 
first arose during the Second World War. Military use of SSR is known as 
Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) [1]. The information from the IFF system 
forms part of the decision aid process, which must be followed before a 
weapon is fired, or action is taken against a non-friendly target. 
During military training or conflict, a secure IFF mode is used to identify 
friendly targets, using Cryptographic Computers (CCs) connected to the 
interrogator and the transponder. The interrogator CC typically generates 
encrypted interrogation pulses and informs the interrogator when to expect a 
reply if a friendly platform has successfully decrypted the interrogation. When 
the transponder receives an encrypted interrogation, it passes it to the 
3 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
p
 To
wn
attached CC, and if the CC successfully decrypts the interrogation, it informs 
the transponder when to generate the reply. The interrogator identifies a 
target as a friend only if it correctly replies to a specific number of secure 
interrogations in the correct time windows. 
In 1996, the USA Department of Defence (DOD) Command Joint Chief of 
Staff directed that "all DOD Aircraft IFF systems be fully operational in order to 
render aircraft mission capable" [7]. 
The technical characteristics of SSRlIFF are governed by the Standardization 
Agreement, known as the ST ANAG-4193 document, which was created by 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) [2] military agency for 
standardization. 
1.2 Primary vs Secondary Radar 
Primary and secondary radar are often used jointly, and in most cases their 
antennas rotate simultaneously [3]. The primary radar typically detects a 
target, whereas the secondary radar determines the target's reported identity 
and altitude, in order to identify it as a friend or a foe. 
In congested aircraft traffic, a traditional ATC Plan Position Indicator (PPI), 
and even a more modern display system would tend to become cluttered, 
especially if information is only displayed from the primary radar. In such 
cases, it can become extremely difficult to relate a blip on the screen to a 
target in the sky, even if their flight plans are known to the ATC operator. The 
secondary radar provides additional information from the aircraft transponder, 
which, if used in conjunction with the information provided by the primary 
radar, facilitates easier manual or automatic tracking of targets on the ATC 
display. 
The power needed to transmit an interrogation in SSR is significantly less 
than what is needed for primary radar operating at the same range, due to the 
two-way nature of the link in SSR. The transmitter need only generate enough 
power for the interrogation to be detected by the transponder. There is no 
need to cater for losses resulting from the return path, as in the case of 
primary radar, which results in longer cover at a lower power cost. Unwanted 
echoes are not picked up and clutter is avoided in SSR, because the 
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transmitter and the receiver are not in tune with each other, as they use 
different frequencies to transmit and receive interrogations/replies as 
described in Section 1.1 and reference [3]. SSR thus costs a fraction of the 
cost of an equivalent primary radar [1]. 
1.3 SSRlIFF Major System Components and Top Level Project 
Scope 
The main components of SSRlIFF systems as depicted in Figure 1.1 are: 
• Antennas: Interrogator systems are typically equipped with directional 
antennas. Transponders usually receive and transmit their replies via 
one or two omnidirectional antennas. 
• Transponders: These are transceivers with the capability of receiving 
electronic challenges from interrogators in order to process them and 
to transmit an appropriate reply [4]. Transponders can be ground-
based, ship-based or airborne. 
• Interrogators: These are transceivers with the capability of 
transmitting electronic challenges and receiving replies from target 
transponders. These replies are processed in order to determine the 
targets' identity, position and range. Interrogators can similarly be 
ground-based, ship-based or airborne. 
• Cryptographic Computers: These provide for a secure encrypted 
challenge/reply operation, and they are used in conjunction with 
interrogators and transponders. 
• Displays: Interrogator systems are typically connected to PPls or more 
modern display systems, where the positions and identities of targets 
are graphically presented. These displays can be shared with or 
separate from the primary radar display. 
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Figure 1.1 : Typical SSRlIFF system components. The box created by the dashed 
lines and arrows represents the top level project scope, which is to emulate the TTL 
timing behaviour of hundreds of distinct identity SSRlIFF transponders and their ecs, 
which are fitted onto mobile targets. When interrogated, the system will provide 
STANAG-4193 (2) timing compliant replies, including garbled and FRUIT reply 
scenarios simultaneously from the emulated targets, bypassing the RF link and 
feeding directly into the interrogator signal processor. In order to cater for effects 
caused by having multiple interrogators in dose range to the interrogator being 
tested, some basic aspects of SSR/IFF interrogators and interrogator cryptographic 
computers (ICCs) are also emulated . 
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1.4 Thesis Outline 
The structure of this thesis is illustrated in Figure 1.2 below. 
Introduction 
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User 
Requirements 
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Requirements 
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& Results 
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Conclusion & 
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Figure 1.2 : Thesis overview 
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The following subsections provide short summaries of each of the forthcoming 
chapters in the thesis. 
1.4.1 Chapter 2: User Requirements 
Chapter 2 captures the user requirements for the SSR/IFF target emulator. 
The main goal of this project is to build a system that can test an interrogator 
signal processor in a laboratory by utilizing real-time target scenarios. The 
system must be able to emulate the digital domain behaviour of SSR/IFF 
NATO STANAG-4193 [2] timing compliant replies from hundreds of distinct 
identity mobile targets equipped with TxPs and CCs in a 360 0 panoramic 
view. The system must be able to support SSRlIFF interrogations in modes 1, 
2, 3/A, C and secure mode 4. It must also be able to generate FRUIT and 
garbled replies, and it must additionally be a foundation for future SSRlIFF 
interrogator design and development activities. 
The user requirements for the SSRlIFF target emulator are broken down into 
functional requirements, hardware (HW) requirements and future use 
requirements. 
1.4.2 Chapter 3: System Concepts and 
Requirements Allocation 
Chapter 3 analyses the user requirements described in Chapter 2, in order to 
create a system breakdown structure for the SSRlIFF target emulator. 
Each of the subsystems is discussed in a separate subsection in Chapter 3. 
A concept summary is produced of all the operational and timing aspects 
relevant to the system, with the aim of understanding the functionality and 
timing of the subsystem. Thereafter, the requirements are allocated for each 
subsystem. The systems engineering approach is aimed at reducing technical 
risks and allowing for proper system design and implementation. 
The last section of the chapter provides a traceability matrix of the user 
requirements (Table 7.1), which maps the user requirements as set out in 
Chapter 2, and the relevant derived requirements as described in Chapter 3. 
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This traceability matrix guarantees that all user requirements have been 
considered in the design and implementation of the system. 
1.4.3 Chapter 4: System Design 
Chapter 4 discusses the design of the SSR/IFF emulator. The Digital Signal 
Processor (DSP) and Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) used in the 
design are presented in a target HW overview section, which is followed by a 
top-level concept design summary. The system design is partitioned between 
the DSP and the FPGA, and the reasoning behind the partitioning as well as 
the design tradeoffs are discussed. The low-level detailed design of the 
SSR/IFF emulator is also covered in depth. Figure 4.2 illustrates a top-level 
diagram of the system. 
1.4.4 Chapter 5: System Implementation 
Chapter 5 discusses the implementation of the design that was presented in 
Chapter 4. The topics that are discussed include FPGA rapid prototyping, 
VHDL co-simulation and the DSP SW. The implementation tool-chain and 
methodologies relating to the FPGA and DSP, as well as VHDL and C source 
code portability issues, and devices resource utilization are also examined. 
The last section of this chapter presents the observed system limitations. 
1.4.5 Chapter 6: System Testing and Results 
Chapter 6 verifies the system against selected key requirements, as set out in 
Chapter 3. Test cases have been designed to check the capabilities of the 
system and to verify the system requirements. Some tests were done on the 
VHDL co-simulation level; these include single target fine timing tests, which 
are necessary because of the advanced display capabilities of Modelsim [10]. 
The second level of tests presented is more complex and performed on the 
target HW involving the emulation of multiple targets and a targets crossing 
test. Graphical test results are captured using screen shots from a logic 
analyser and are presented after each test. 
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1.4.6 Chapter 7: Conclusions and Future Work 
Chapter 7 summarises and concludes the SSRlIFF target emulator project. 
The system is found to be compliant with requirements, except for the system 
limitations discussed in Chapter 5. Recommendations to port the design to a 
cheaper board and possible areas of future improvement are discussed. 
1.5 Summary 
This chapter has introduced the SSRlIFF emulator project, which is the 
purpose of this research. It has also provided the background to SSR/IFF, 
briefly comparing this with primary radar, and a summary of the major system 
components of the SSRlIFF system from a top-level perspective. A brief 
thesis overview describing each of the succeeding chapters has also been 
presented. The following chapter aims to capture the user requirements for 
the SSRlIFF emulator system, which are divided into functional requirements, 
HW requirements and future use requirements. 
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2. Chapter 2: User Requirements 
The SSRlIFF target emulator is required to be a real-time laboratory system, 
which is used to test and debug an SSRIIFF interrogator signal processor. 
When the system is interrogated, it is required to generate STANAG-4193 [2] 
digital timing compliant replies from mobile targets that are equipped with 
SSR/IFF TxPs and CCs. Each of these targets have distinct user-defined 
SSR/IFF modes 1, 2, 3/A (identification response), C (aircraft altitude 
response) and secure mode 4 reply codes, which exist in a 3600 panoramic 
view. The system is additionally required to generate other effects, to which 
the interrogator may be exposed, such as FRUIT. 
The functional requirements for the SSR/IFF target emulator are listed in 
Section 2.1, whereas HW and future use requirements are listed in Sections 
2.2 and 2.3. 
2.1 Functional Requirements 
The SSR/IFF target emulator must be capable of performing the following 
functions: 
2.1.1 TxP and Tee Emulation 
The system must be able to emulate the digital timing behaviour of STANAG-
4193 [2] compliant SSR/IFF TxPs and Transponder Cryptographic Computers 
(TCCs) when validating received interrogations and generating replies 
thereto. 
2.1.2 SSR/IFF Reply Modes 
When it is enabled to do so, the system must be able to generate ST ANAG-
4193 [2] SSRlIFF replies in modes 1, 2, 3/A, C and secure mode 4, as well as 
emergency and SPI replies. 
2.1.3 Number of Targets 
In a single antenna sweep, the system must be able to produce SSR/IFF 
replies from 0 to 1,500 emulated targets equipped with SSR/IFF TxPs and 
CCs. The targets may be evenly distributed in 3600 • 
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2.1.4 Distinct Target Identity 
Each emulated target must utilise distinct, user definable, and SSRIIFF 
STANAG-4193 [2] compliant reply codes for modes 1, 2, 3/A, C. 
2.1.5 Friendly and Non-Friendly Targets 
The system must be able to emulate both friendly and non-friendly secure 
mode 4 targets. 
2.1.6 Real-time Operation 
The system must operate in a real-time mode, which means that the amount 
of time it takes from the instant in which the system receives an interrogation 
to the time it generates the emulated replies must be proportional to both the 
ranges of the emulated targets, and the ST ANAG-4193 [2] requirements, for 
the maximum time allowed for a TxP and a TCC to process received 
interrogations and generate replies thereto. 
2.1.7 Continuous Operation 
The system must operate in a continuous live mode, which means that it must 
react to interrogation parameter changes received on-the-fly (i.e. Pulse 
Repetition Frequency (PRF), interrogation modes, target location and range, 
etc.) set by the user, without the user needing to stop or pause the system in 
order to change the settings. 
2.1.8 Target Mobility and Space 
The system must be able to emulate mobile targets equipped with SSRIIFF 
TxPs and TCCs moving within 360 0 and at a range of from 0 to 600km and a 
mode C altitude from -1,000 feet to 121,000 feet. 
2.1.9 Garbled and FRUIT Replies 
The system must be able to create both garbled and FRUIT SSRIIFF reply 
scenarios in modes 1, 2, 3/A, C and secure mode 4. 
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2.1.10 Antenna Interface 
The system must be able to receive Azimuth Change Pulses (ACP) and 
Azimuth Reference Pulses (ARP) from an IFF antenna, which completes a full 
rotation in 8 seconds and provides 4096 ACP counts per rotation. If the 
antenna is not available at any given time, the system must also be able to 
generate the ACP/ARP pulses and supply them to the interrogator being 
tested. The antenna Effective Beam Width (EBW) is 5°. 
2.2 HW Requirements 
The emulator must be designed and implemented to run on the Innovative 
Integration Quixote [8J DSP board shown in Figure 2.1. Information about the 
board is available on the official Innovative Integration [8J website. A suitable 
off-tha-shelf cPCI solution , which contains a single board computer running 
Windows XP, and a card-cage with a cPCI backplane, has been chosen for 
the Quixote to plug into it. If communication via the cPCI bus is deemed 
unnecessary, Joint Test Action Group (JTAG) may be used as an alternative 
in order to communicate with the DSP and the FPGA. 
The inpuUoutput of the emulator must be made available from/to the 
interrogator signal processor via the digital input/output general purpose pins, 
which are available on the board. 
QUIXote 
Figure 2.1 : Innovative Integration Quixote (8) board 
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2.3 Requirements for Future Use 
The IFF Transceiver Card (ITRC) is an RF SSRIIFF test transceiver card that 
is currently being developed by another Masters student in the Radar Remote 
Sensing Group (RRSG) at the University of Cape Town. The system 
presented in this thesis must suggest an interface point in order to allow the 
ITRC to be integrated in the future. 
2.4 Summary 
This chapter has presented the SSRlIFF emulator user requirements. These 
have been subdivided into functional requirements, HW requirements and 
requirements for future use of the target emulator. In the next chapter, the 
system will be broken down into subsystems, and each subsystem will 
consequently be analysed and described by translating the user requirements 
into technical engineering specifications. 
14 
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3. Chapter 3: System Concepts and Requirements 
Allocation 
The following chapter aims to analyse the high level user requirements 
described in the preceding chapter as a basis for creating an appropriate 
system breakdown structure for the SSRlIFF target emulator. Concept 
summaries of relevant aspects of each subsystem of the target emulator are 
provided where needed. Requirements derived from the concept summaries 
or directly from the user requirements are allocated to each subsystem. The 
aim of this systems engineering approach is to minimise the technical risks of 
the project, and to allow for proper system design, implementation and 
testing. 
Very limited literature is available for research on SSRIIFF, because of the 
military use of this technology. As a result, most of the information is classified 
and thus not accessible to the public. The NATO document describing the 
SSRlIFF standard [2] and the classic SSR/IFF book by Stevens [1] were 
studied in depth, and have been used to derive the timing and operational 
requirements for SSRIIFF modes 1, 2, 3/A, C and secure mode 4. 
The final section of this chapter is a traceability matrix, which maps the user 
requirements in the preceding chapter to their relevant derived requirements 
in this chapter. This ensures that all the user requirements have been 
considered. 
3.1 User Requirements Analysis 
The aim of the user requirements analysis is to examine the user 
requirements in the preceding chapter and to extract a system breakdown 
structure from them, which will also take into account any special 
considerations for the system design. Once the operational concepts of each 
subsystem in the structure have been explained, the requirements can be 
translated into engineering specifications. 
The SSR/IFF target emulator system can be broken down into the 
subsystems depicted in Figure 3.1. The following points succinctly present the 
analysis. 
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1. The fact that user requirements exist for TxP and TCC emulation, reply 
modes and real-time operation shows that there is specific user interest 
in TxP and TCC operation and timing characteristics. Therefore, 
standalone TxP and TCC subsystems will be placed in the system 
breakdown structure. 
2. Since the system is required to test an existing interrogator, even 
though there are no specific user requirements in respect of the 
interrogator, there are requirements for the implementation of FRUIT, 
which means that the system has to emulate the behaviour of multiple 
interrogator transmitters. Interrogator and ICC subsystems (for mode 4 
FRUIT replies) will therefore be part of the system breakdown 
structure. 
3. As the system must be able to generate FRUIT and garbled replies, a 
separate subsystem will be created for these. 
4. Subsystems allocated for target identity and mobility will be created 
because of the user requirements for multiple targets, target mobility 
and distinct target identity (including the mode 4 friendly/non-friendly 
status). Requirements for information, which is necessary to maintain 
target identity existence and continuation in the simulated space, have 
to be allocated to these subsystems. 
5. The system is required to operate in a continuous live mode and in real 
time, which must be taken into account when designing the necessary 
subsystems in order to accomplish these tasks. Consequently, 
subsystems will be created in respect of the requirements allocation for 
continuous and real-time operation. 
6. The system is required to interface with an SSR/IFF antenna or to 
emulate one. The implication of this for the system and the 
requirements for an emulated antenna will be covered in the section 
that examines the target mobility subsystem. 
7. The use of the Quixote board is a user requirement; therefore, it is 
unnecessary to conduct a study identifying a more suitable 
processor(s)/board; the results of this project will however indicate 
whether additional processing power is needed to meet the user 
requirements. 
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8. Finally. the requirements allocation for the ITRC interface. and general 
HW interfaces to the interrogator will be covered separately in the 
sections dealing with the HW and ITRC interface subsystem. 
In Sections 3.4 to 3.14 below. each of the subsystems in Figure 3.1 will be 
studied and the relevant requirements for each of them will be identified and 
allocated. 
SSR/IFF Target 
Emulator 
SSR/IFF Transponder FRUIT and SSR/IFF Interrogator 
Transponder Cryptographic Garble Interrogator Cryptographic Computer Generator Computer 
Target Identity Target Mobility Continuous Real-nme HW&llRC Operation Operation Manager Manager Manager Manager Interface 
Figure 3.1 : SSRlIFF target emulator system breakdown structure. The figure 
presents the proposed subsystems of the SSRlIFF target emulator system. 
3.2 Subsystem Concept Summaries Introduction 
In order to understand the operational concepts of the subsystems in the 
system breakdown structure, a concept summary of the relevant aspects of 
the project will be presented in respect of each subsystem. For each 
individual requirement, a more detailed examination will be presented where 
needed. 
The user reqUirements in the preceding chapter clearly stated that the system 
must comply with the timing requirements as set by the NATO document 
STANAG-4193 [21. and thus th is document has been used as the source of 
most of the timing related analysis activities. Its use as a source of theoretical 
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SSR/IFF information has proven problematic however, because the authors of 
the document intended it to be a technical specification document for 
distribution to military equipment manufacturers rather than an academic 
document. 
3.3 Requirements Allocation Introduction 
In systems engineering, requirements are traditionally allocated to functions 
after a functional analysis has been performed, and a functional breakdown 
structure has been created. A system breakdown structure is then created, 
where each subsystem is responsible for implementing a subset of the overall 
system requirements [5] [6]. 
Requirements will be allocated directly to subsystems of the SSRlIFF target 
emulator in the system breakdown structure in order to simplify the process. 
In the following sections of this chapter, requirements will be allocated to each 
subsystem in Figure 3.1. Allocated requirements will be derived from the 
concept summaries as well as directly from the user requirements. 
The terminology used while creating the system specifications in the sections 
below involves the use of "shall" to indicate a mandatory condition whereas 
"may" is used for allowable conditions. 
3.4 TxP Concept Summary and Requirements 
The subsections below present a concept summary for SSRlIFF TxP digital 
timing characteristics relevant to the system, followed by a listing of the 
requirements allocated to the emulated TxP. 
3.4.1 SSRlIFF TxP Concept Summary 
In order to meet the TxP specific user requirements, an analysis will be 
performed of the operational, functional and timing requirements of the 
SSRlIFF TxP, which are relevant to the system. 
3.4.1.1 SSRlIFF Modes of Operation 
There are currently 7 commonly used modes of operation in SSRlIFF, namely 
modes 1, 2, 3/A, C, 4, 5 and S. Military platforms typically use modes 1, 2, 3, 
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4 and 5, whereas civilian platforms typically use modes A, C and S [1]. Modes 
1, 2 and 3 are known as Selectivity Identification Feature (SIF) modes [1]. 
Mode S is currently being used to replace SIF modes, although many 
countries around the world are still only using SIF modes. The target emulator 
will support SIF modes 1, 2, 3/A and C, and the secure mode 4. 
3.4.1.2 SSR Non-Secure Modes 
Pulses transmitted by the interrogator are known as interrogations, or 
challenges. In SSR, interrogations are received by the TxP in modes 1, 2, 3/A 
and C in the form of three pulses labelled P1, P2 and P3, as depicted in 
Figure 3.2. 
Pl I P2 I 
1 1 
1 1 
I+E------------------------------+)1 
1 ?J.LS 1 
1 
P3 
Time 
Figure 3.2 : From [1]. SSR interrogation signal format. The time duration between P1 
and P3 determines the mode of the SIF interrogation. 
The time interval between pulses P1 and P3 determine the interrogation 
mode, i.e. the type of information requested by the interrogator from the target 
TxP, as described in Table 3.1. Pulse P2 is the side-lobe suppression pulse 
and will be discussed in Section 3.4.1.4. 
The military typically uses interrogations in modes 1 and 2 to request the 
target's identity and mission number; this can be assigned by the military 
agency in charge, and it can be set on the TxP by the target crew, captain or 
pilot prior to a mission [1] [4]. Mode 3/A is used in civil aviation for air traffic 
control purposes, and in the military for target identification. Mode C is 
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generally used in civil aviation to request the target altitude, which is reported 
by an altitude encoder (altimeter) connected to the TxP [1]. 
Table 3.1 : From [1]. Common SSR Interrogation Modes Summary 
\Interrogation MdCl~IV~~~~: liM - P3 Spaclnmms) User {';~;]! 
L. 
1 3 Military 
2 5 Military 
3/A 8 Military/Civil 
C 21 Civil 
SSR Replies: 
The typical SSR reply format is shown in the figure below. 
F1 C1 A1 C2 A2 C4 A4 X 61 01 62 02 64 D4 F2 
Figure 3.3 : General reply format of SSR SIF modes (adapted from [2]). The non-
secure mode reply consists of a set of framing pulses called F1 and F2, which are 
always present in a reply [1]. Between these framing pulses are 13 data pulses. One 
of the pulses, labelled "X" is not used, leaving 12 data pulses and allowing for a 
maximum of 212 (4096) possible reply code combinations [1]. 
Not all the data pulses illustrated in Figure 3.3 are necessarily used in all SSR 
modes [1]. Table 3.2 presents the designations of these pulses. 
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Table 3 .2 : From [1}. SSR Data Pulses Designation 
Interrogation Mode Maximum Number of Pulse Designations (see Figure 
Possible Reply 3.3) 
Combinations 
1 32 codes B4, C1 , C2, C4 not used 
2 4096 All 12 pulses 
3/A 4096 All 12 pulses 
C 2048 01 not used 
Translation of Mode C Replies: 
Mode C replies are used to report the target altitude to the interrogator. An 
altitude encoder is typically connected to the TxP, providing it with the altitude 
information, which is then translated by the TxP into the appropriate mode C 
reply. 
SSR SPI and Emergency Replies: 
The ground interrogator operator is able to request the target pilot or captain 
to turn on a switch labelled SPI via an audio channel. The switch is routed to 
the TxP, and an identification of position reply (also known as a SPI reply), is 
then transmitted by the TxP. SPI is supported in modes " 2 or 3/A. In the 
case of mode 1, it is comprised of two consecutive replies separated by a 
fixed delay, as opposed to the normal single reply group. In the case of 
modes 2 and 3/A [1] an extra pulse is transmitted after the end of a reply 
group. In the past, when ATC controllers encountered visual problems with 
the PPI display when trying to track targets manually by checking replies, they 
would often ask specific pilots to identify themselves using an SPI reply [3]. 
Emergency replies in modes 1, 2 and 3/A indicate an emergency or hijack 
condition on the platform, and the emergency switch connected to the TxP 
can be set manually by the pilot or the captain. The result of the activation of 
this switch is the generation of a normal, single reply group, followed by three 
sets of framing pulses F1-F2 from the TxP. SPI and emergency replies are 
shown in Figure 3.4. 
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SSR Summary: 
A summary of the timing characteristics of SSR modes 1, 2, 3/A and C is 
depicted in Figure 3.4. The interrogator side-lobe suppression (lSLS) in Figure 
3.4 will be discussed in Section 3.4.1.4. 
JUL 
>+--+< 
JLJL 
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I I I 
I I I 
: .. : .... nnnnnnh I h : JUUUUUUlru u u u u u Y Y L 
: I I 
I I I 
I I I 
I I I 
I I I 
I I I 
I I I 
I I I 
I : I 
I' 
• 
MJl H' --
Figure 3.4 : From [2]. SSR Timing Diagram for Modes 1, 2, 3/A and C 
3.4.1.3 IFF Secure Mode 4 
Mode 4 is a method that enables the interrogator to determine a friendly target 
with certainty. Added security measures have been built into the 
challenge/response mechanism in mode 4, which hinder a foe target's ability 
to copy the identity of a friendly target in a non-secure mode. These 
mechanisms leave very little room for an identification error. 
A secure mode 4 interrogation received by the TxP differs from non-secure 
modes in that it comprises thirty-seven pulses as opposed to three, as seen in 
Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.8. The first four pulses are known as the "Sync Pulse 
Group" [2], whereas the fifth pulse is the side-lobe suppression pulse, as will 
22 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
be discussed in Section 3.4.1.4 below. The following 32 pulses consist of an 
encrypted message generated by the ICC. The message contains the reply 
delay value for which the TxP must wait, before producing a mode 4 reply; 
this is in the form of three pulses, as seen at the bottom of Figure 3.8. 
If a target produces a certain number or percentage of delayed replies, which 
correspond correctly to the decrypted values in the received challenges, the 
interrogator will declare that target a friend. As a result, the target will be 
plotted as a friend on the radar display. 
Sync Pulse group 
( 
P1 P2 P3 
Jl 
IE 
I 
I 
IE 
I 41lS 
I( 
I 61lS 
:E 
I 81lS 
• 
P4 
I 
I 
• I 
I 
• I 
PS 
I 
I 
I 
I 'E +-------------------------+.1 I 10 IlS 
32 Information Pulse Positions 
E • 
01 032 
· .. ··· .......... ·· .......... · .......... ·fL 
Information pulses in any 32 positions 
(determined cryptographically). Pulse 
position interval 21lS. Additionally. All 
pulses are inserted between any two 
consecutive unoccupied positions. Pulse 
position interval is 21lS and the first All 
position is 91lS from Pl. 
Figure 3.5 : Adopted from [2]. IFF secure mode 4 challenge timing diagram. Anti 
Interference Interrogation (All) pulses will be covered in the following subsection 
The abovementioned reply delay value is added to a fixed delay value, the 
total value of which the TxP must wait before it may produce a reply. This 
fixed delay allows the TxP enough time to pass on the challenge to the TCC 
attached to it, as shown in Figure 1.1, and it furthermore allows time for the 
TCC to decrypt the challenge. This delay mechanism further allows the 
interrogator to validate the target range accurately, which is done based on 
the exact time when the reply was received from the target, as illustrated in 
Figure 3.6. The secure mode 4 reply comprises a set of three pulses, as 
shown in Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.8, although these have no data significance. 
The important issue is the correct timing [3]. 
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Figure 3.6 : Example of secure mode 4 reply validation algorithm. As the interrogator 
antenna rotates, and as the target is illuminated in the beam, the scenario in the 
figure may repeat several times, based on factors such as the beam width , the target 
speed, the antenna rotation period, the range of the target and the PRF of the 
interrogator. The number of times the above operation needs to happen before a 
target is declared a friend is dependent on the interrogator design. 
Anti Interference Interrogation (All) Pulses: 
The 32 pulses or pulse posilions may not always be used, as whether they 
are used or not is dependent upon the value of the encrypted message. 
STANAG"4193 [2] speCifies that All pulses must be "inserted between any 
two adjacent unoccupied pulse positions of the information pulse group" [2]. 
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Figure 3.7 : Secure mode 4 All pulse scenario. All pulses are inserted between any 
two adjacent unoccupied pulses in the encrypted interrogation. 
Mode 4 Summary: 
A summary of the secure mode 4 and its timing characteristics is presented in 
Figure 3.8 below. 
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Figure 3.8 : From [2). IFF timing diagrams for secure mode 
3.4.1 .4 Interrogator S ideelobe Suppression 
Interrogator antenna pattems are not perfect and may have undesirable side-
lobe radiation patterns [2]. [3] . TxPs do not reply if they are located in the 
side-lobes of the antenna as that may cause the interrogator to presume 
falsely that a target is present in the direction of the main beam. A side-lobe 
suppression pulse is thus transmitted with a higher amplitude by a separate 
antenna of the interrogator in the side-lobes to inform TxPs that they are 
located in the side-lobes and should not reply to received interrogations. This 
is known as Interrogator Side-Lobe Suppression (ISLS) [2]. 
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Figure 3.9 : From [3]. SSRJIFF interrogator antenna patterns. If a target is in the main 
antenna beam, it will receive a P2 pulse of an amplitude that is lower than that of P1 
and P3, and it should therefore reply to the received interrogation. For the secure 
mode 4, pulse P5 is designated as the side-lobe suppression pulse. 
An interrogator, with an antenna arrangement as in Figure 3.9 for modes 1, 2, 
3/A and C, transmits pulses P1 and P3 using the main directional antenna, 
whereas P2 is transmitted via the separate omnidirectional antenna. In secure 
mode 4, pulse P5 is the side-lobe suppression pulse and it is transmitted by 
the omnidirectional antenna. In the mode 4 interrogation , pulse P2 is 
transmitted with the directional antenna to suppress TxPs, which are not 
enabled to reply in mode 4. The location of P5 in the secure mode 4 
interrogation is presented in Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.8. 
3.4.2 SSRlIFF TxP Requirements 
The following subsections discuss the requirements allocation in respect of 
the emulated SSRlIFF TxP subsystem. 
3.4.2.1 Non·Secure Interrogation Mode Detection and Tolerance 
The received interrogations in modes 1, 2, 3/A, and C are detected based on 
the time interval between the pulses P1 and P3 (see Figure 3.4 above). 
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Requirement: 
The TxP shall reply to not less than 90% of received interrogations in modes 
1, 2, 31A and C, in compliance with the durations of the pulses P1 to P3 as in 
Table 3.3. This is further in compliance with paragraphs 3.2.1.3.1 , 3.2.1.3.2 
and 4.2.S.1.a of STANAG-4193 [2]. 
Table 3.3 : SSR P1 to P3 pulse intervals and tolerances 
Pulae(a) Interrogation Mode Interval and Tolerances (j.1s) 
P1 to P3 1 3 + 0.1 , - 0.05 
2 5±0.1 
31A 8±0.1 
C 21 ± 0.1 
P1 to P2 1,2, 31Aand C 2+0.5,-0.15 
3.4.2.2 Non-Secure Modes Interrogation Pulse Width Validation 
STANAG-4193 [2] requires the TxP to validate the pulse widths of received 
interrogations before replying to them. 
Requirement: 
The TxP shall validate the width of received interrogation pulses against the 
durations in Table 3.4. This is in compliance with paragraphs 3.2.1.2, 
4.2.S.1.b and 4.2.6.3.1 of STANAG-4193 [2]. 
Table 3.4 : SSR interrogaUon pulses duration and tolerance 
Pulae(a) Duration and Tolerance (j.1s) 
P1 and P3 0.8 ± 0.1 
P2 0.8 + 0.051· 0.1 
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3.4.2.3 Secure Mode Interrogation Detection and Tolerance 
STANAG-4193 [2] specifies that a mode 4 interrogation should have "a sync-
pulse group" [2J, labelled P1 , P2, P3 and P4, and an ISLS pulse, labelled PS. 
The TxP should validate the timing characteristics of received mode 4 
challenges before passing them on to the CC for decryption in order to obtain 
the correct reply delay (see Section 3.4.1.3). 
If the challenge contains All pulses, their timing characteristics have to be 
validated. 
Requirements: 
a) The TxP shall provide the CC with received secure mode 4 challenges 
that comply with the timing intervals in Table 3.S. This is in compliance 
with paragraphs 3.2.1.4, 3.2.1 .S.1 to 3.2.1.S.4 and 3.2.1.2.4.2.2 of 
STANAG-4193 [2]. 
b) The timing of All pulses "inserted between any two adjacent 
unoccupied pulse positions of the information pulse group" [2J shall be 
validated. 
c) The challenges provided to the CC shall include the P3, P4 and PS 
pulses, and the following 32 information pulse group shall include the 
All pulses, in compliance with paragraph 4.2.S.2.1 of STANAG-4193 
[2J. 
Table 3.5 : IFF Secure Mode 4 Pulse Intervals and Tolerances 
Pul ••• Interval and Tolerance (J.1S) 
P1 to P2 2±O.1 
P1 to P3 4 ±O.1 
P1 to P4 6±O.1 
P1 to P5 8±O.1 
Combined relation between P1 , P2, Not greater than 0.6 from their normal intervals 
P3 and P4 
P1 to first Information pulse D1 10 ± 0.1 
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-Pulses Interval and Tolerance (~s) 
01 to 032 ± 0.1 with respect to P1 
P1 to First All (if applicable) 9 ± 0.1 
P1 to any All odd multiples of 1 ± 0.1 
3.4.2.4 Secure Mode 4 Interrogation Pulse Width Validation 
The TxP should validate the pulse widths of received secure mode 4 
challenges before passing them on to the CC for decryption. 
Requirement: 
In compliance with paragraphs 3.2.1.4. 4.2.5.2. 1 and 4.2.6.3.2 of STANAG-
4193 [2], the TxP shall validate the pulse widths of received mode 4 
challenges against the timing information in Table 3.6. 
Table 3.6 : IFF secure mode 4 pulse durations 
Pulse{s) Duration and Tolerance (~s) 
Pl to PS O.S ± 0.1 
01 to D32 information group and All O.S±O.1 
pulses 
3.4.2.5 Enable Trigger Signal Generation 
A secure mode 4 interrogation received by the TxP wi ll be passed to the CC 
connected to it. The enable trigger signal informs the CC that a challenge is 
going to be passed to it for decryption (see Figure 3.10). 
Requirement: 
The TxP shall generate an enable trigger signal to the TCe in compliance with 
the timing in Table 3.7, if a valid secure mode 4 challenge is received. This is 
in compliance with paragraphs 1.2.6 and 4.2.5.2.2 of STANAG-4193 [2]. 
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Table 3.7 : Mode 4 enable trigger timing and tolerance 
Description Time and Tolerance (IlS) 
Enable Trigger Pulse Position 0.45 t 0.05 after P4 
Enable Trigger Pulse Duration 0.5 to 3.0 
3.4.2.6 Interrogator Side-lobe Suppression 
TxPs in the antenna side-lobes of the interrogator receive side-lobe 
suppression pulses with greater amplitude than other pulses in the 
interrogation group; this should prevent TxPs from replying to such 
interrogations (Section 3.4.1.4). 
Requirements: 
a) In compliance with paragraphs 2.2.3, 3.2.3, 4.2.7.1, 4.2.7.2 of 
STANAG-4193 [2], the TxP shall not reply to more than 10% of valid 
interrogations received in modes 1, 2, 3/A and C if a P2 side-lobe 
suppression pulse is valid (according to the interrogation group timing 
specifications as set out in Sections 3.4.2.1 and 3.4.2.2). This is also 
applicable to a P5 side-lobe suppression pulse in secure mode 4 
according to the timing specifications in Sections 3.4.2.3 and 3.4.2.4. 
b) The TxP suppression period shall be as brief as possible, and shall not 
exceed 35 ~S, in compliance with paragraphs 4.2.8.4.2 and 4.2.8.4.3 of 
STANAG-4193 [2]. 
3.4.2.7 TxP Internal Suppression 
When the TxP decodes a correct interrogation. it must not accept any new 
incoming interrogations. valid or invalid. for the time needed to produce a 
reply to the first interrogation for modes 1, 2, 3/A, C and 4 [2]. 
Requirements: 
a) In compliance with paragraphs 4.2.11 and 4.2.11 .1 from STANAG-
4193 [2], the TxP shall not decode incoming interrogations if a valid 
interrogation has been deooded until the appropriate reply has been 
produced. 
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-b) For modes 1, 2, 3/A and C, the TxP shall be able to process the first 
pulse of an incoming interrogation within 10 ~S of the completion of the 
reply. 
c) For mode 4, the TxP shall be able to process the first pulse of an 
incoming interrogation within 290 ± 10 J.lS unless the reply is produced 
before such time, in compliance with paragraph 4.2. 11 .2.b of STANAG-
4193 [2J . 
3.4.2.8 Non-secure Modes Replies 
A mode 1, 2, 3/A or C reply generated by the TxP after receiving a valid 
interrogation oonsists of a pair of framing pulses, namely F1-F2. The data 
pulses between F1 and F2 are relevant to the reply mode and the reply code. 
Il is important to follow the reply timing characteristics by the TxPs in order to 
ensure that the interrogator will accept and identify the replies. 
Requirements: 
a) The replies produced by the TxP in modes 1, 2, 3/A and C shall oomply 
with the timing characteristics in Table 3.8. This is in compliance with 
paragraphs 4.3. 1.2, 4.3.1.3, 4.3.1.3. 1 and 4.3.1 .3.2 of STANAG-4193 [2J. 
Table 3.B : Non-secure modes reply timing charaderistics 
Description Interval and Tolerance (J.ls) 
Reply Group Pulse Duration 0.45:t: 0.1 
F1 to F2 interval 20.3 ± 0.1 
Pulse Interval Tolerance for Each t 0.1 
Pulse with Respect to F1 
Pulse Interval Tolerance for Each ± 0. 15 
Pulse with Respect to any other 
Pulse Except F1 
32 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
b) The reply group data pulses produced by the TxP shall follow the ~ming 
as set out in Table 3.9 with respect to the first framing pulse F1, in 
compliance with paragraph 4.3.1.3.2 of STANAG-4193 [2] . 
Table 3.9 : From [2]. Non-secure modes reply pulse positions from F1 
Pulse Nominal Position (J1s) 
C1 1.45 
A1 2.90 
C2 4.35 
A2 5.80 
C4 7.25 
A4 8.70 
X 10.15 
B1 11 .60 
01 13.05 
B2 14.50 
02 15.95 
B4 17.40 
D4 18.85 
c) In compliance with paragraph 4.3.1.3.3 of STANAG-4193 [2]. the TxP 
reply shall ·consist of four digits each of Which lie between 0 and 7 
indusive and consist of the sum of the subscripts of the corresponding 
pulses employed"[2]. following the designations in Table 3.10 and Table 
3.',. 
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Table 3.10 : From (2). Modes 1, 2, 3JA and C reply code designation 
Digit Pulse Group 
First A (Al , A2, A4) 
Second 8 (81 , 82, 84) 
Third C(Cl , C2, C4) 
Fourth 0(01 , 02, 04) 
Table 3. 11 : From [2] . Modes " 2, 3/A and C employed reply pulses 
Mode Pulses Employed 
1 A1 , A2, A4, 81 and 82 
2 A, B, CandO 
31A A, B, CandO 
C All pulses A, B, C and Dt except 01 
3.4.2.9 Non-secure Modes SPI and Emergency Replies 
As described in the above subsection 3.4. 1.2, platforms fitted with a TxP may 
be asked to produce SPI replies. Alternatively. the platforrn pilot or captain 
can choose to produce an emergency reply, which indicates to the 
interrogator that there is an emergency condition. 
Requirements: 
aj An SPI reply for mode 1 shall consist of a normal reply, followed by a 
repetition of that reply starting at an interval of 24.65 ± 0.1 ~s from the 
first framing pulse of the first reply, with a tolerance of ± 0.1 ~s from the 
first framing pulse of the first reply, and ± 0.15 ~s to any other pulse in 
the repl y, in compliance with paragraph 4.3.1.6.1 of STANAG-4193 [2]. 
bj An SPI reply in modes 2 and 3/A shall consist of the normal reply 
followed by a single pulse at an interval of 24.65 ~s with a tolerance of 
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± 0.1 ~s from the first framing pulse of the first reply grouP. in 
compliance with paragraph 4.3.1.6.2 of STANAG-4193 (2). 
c) An emergency reply in modes 1. 2 and 3/A shall consist of a normal 
reply group followed by three sets of framing pulses Fl-F2 (empty 
replies) according to the timing in Table 3.12, in compliance with 
paragraph 4.3.1.7.1 ofSTANAG-4193 (2) . 
d) The emergency reply code in mode 3/A shall be 7700 and shall 
override any preselected selected mode 3/A code, in compliance with 
paragraph 4.3.1.7.3 of STANAG-4193 (2). 
Table 3.12 : From [2]. emergency reply groups timing from first reply F1 
Emergency F1 Pulse (J..lS) F2 pulse (J..lS) 
Empty Reply 
Group Number 
2 24.65 ± 0.1 44.95 ± 0.1 
3 49.30 ± 0.1 69.60 ± 0.1 
4 73.95 t. 0 .1 94.25 ± 0.1 
3.4.2.10 Secure Mode 4 Reply 
When the TxP receives a secure mode 4 challenge and validates the timing 
characteristics thereof. it passes that challenge to the attached ee for 
decryption. If the ee successfully decrypts the challenge. it will inform the TxP 
of the delay value in microseconds. This delay value is reported back from the 
ee. which is added to a fixed 202 ~s delay. the value of which the TxP must 
wait for before producing a three pulses reply group as in Figure 3.6 and Figure 
3.B. The delay value reported back from the ee can only be one of sixteen 
possible delay values starting from 0 to 60 ~s in multiples of four. 
Requirements: 
a) The TxP shall produce a reply pulse group consisting of three pulses 
with timing characteristics as in Table 3.13, in compliance with 
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paragraphs 4.3. 1.2, 4.3.1.4, 4.3.1.5, 4.3.1.5.1 and 4.3.1.5.2 of 
STANAG-4193 (2). 
b) The TxP shall have a means of communicating challenges and replies 
to the Tee (described in Section 3.5 below). 
Table 3.13 : IFF secure mode 4 reply timing characteristics 
Description Time and Tolerance (Jls) 
Reply Group 0.45:1:0.1 
Pulses Width 
P1 to P2 interval 1.75±0.05 
P1 to P3 interval 3.5 ± 0.05 
Reply Group 199.5 ± 0.75 + CC Reported Delay 
Position (from 
reception of P4 
pulse of the 
challenge) 
3.4.2.11 Non-Secure Modes Reply Delay 
All STANAG-4193 (2) compliant TxPs have fixed reply delays in respect of 
modes " 2, 3/A and e , which are measured from the reception of the last 
interrogation pulse. The reason for this is to allow the different TxP 
manufacturers to process received interrogations at their own pace, provided 
it does not take longer than the specified delay. Interrogators use this fi xed 
reply delay to determine the range of the replying platform, with an inaccuracy 
of Rx being: 
Rx = (C x Tto )/2 (3.1 ) 
Where C is the pulse propagation time, which in radar is the speed of light in a 
vacuum (299792458ms- l ) [12], whereas Tto is the delay tolerance specified 
below of ± 0.5 ~S . This leads to the tolerance Rx being approximately equal to 
75m, which equates to an uncertainty in range of approximately 150m (75m x 
2). 
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Requirement: 
The TxP reply delay for modes 1, 2 ,3/A and C shall be 3.0 J..ls with a tolerance 
of ± 0.5 J..lS from the rising edge of the interrogation pulse P3 to the rising 
edge of the reply pulse F1, in compliance with paragraph 4.3.4.1 of STANAG-
4193 [2]. 
3.4.2.12 Secure Mode 4 Processing Delay 
The concept applied in Section 3.4.2.11 in respect of the non-secure modes 
can be similarly applied for mode 4, but a longer delay is allowed to enable 
the TxP to pass the challenge to the TCC for decryption (see Figure 3.6). 
However, this must not be confused with the reply delay induced by the TxP 
TCC, which is discussed in Section 3.5.2.4 below. 
Requirement: 
The TxP reply delay for mode 4 shall be 202 J..lS with a tolerance of ± 1.25 J..ls 
from the rising edge of the interrogation pulse P4 to the rising edge of the first 
pulse of the mode 4 reply, in compliance with paragraph 4.3.4.2 of STANAG-
4193 [2]. 
3.4.2.13 TxP Reply Rate 
Requirement: 
The TxP shall have a reply rate capability of 1200 replies per second, in 
compliance with paragraph 4.3.5 of STANAG-4193 [2]. 
3.4.2.14 TxP Video Signal Sampling 
The TxP timing specifications discussed in the subsections above generally 
call for signal tolerance measurements in hundreds of ns, and may be as low 
as 50 ns, as explained in Section 3.4.2.2, for example. Using a 40 MHz clock 
will allow for proper sampling of the signaJs since it is twice the maximum 
frequency. 
Requirement: 
The system shall be able to sample the digital video signals at a speed of at 
least 40 MHz. 
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3.4.2.15 Reply Mode Enable/Disable Selectivity 
Requirement: 
The TxP shall allow for an enable/disable input switch, which either enables or 
disables the replies in a specific interrogation mode. 
3.5 TCC Concept Summary and Requirements 
As depicted in Figure 3.1, the emulation of IFF Tees is necessary to emulate 
secure mode 4 replies. 
3.5.1 IFF TCC Concept Summary 
To meet the relevant aspects of the user requirements, the following 
subsections analyse the related operational and functional characteristics of 
the IFF Tees, as well as the timing requirements, to which the system must 
adhere. These have been compiled using STANAG-4193, with specific 
reference to Appendix 3 of Annex A [2]. For the sake of completeness, 
selected secure mode 4 Tee related topics have been covered under the TxP 
concept summary. 
3.5.1.1 The Operation of IFF TCCs 
The SSRIIFF TxP as described in Section 3.4 is capable of receiving and 
identifying a secure mode 4 encrypted interrogation, which it passes on to the 
Tee for decryption. The IFF secure mode 4 summary contained in Section 
3.4.1.3 and illustrated in Figure 3.8 depicts the correct delay or waiting time of 
the TxP before it generates a standard three-pulse reply, which its value is 
embedded in the challenge and encrypted. If the challenge is successfully 
decrypted by the Tee, the Tee will inform the TxP of the value of that delay. 
The delay can be one of sixteen possible values, as contained in the 
specification for the secure mode 4 reply in Section 3.4.2.10. 
The target carrying the TxP and Tee may be considered a foe by the 
interrogator generating the challenges if the TxP does not generate correct 
replies to a certain percentage (as determined by the interrogator) of the 
overall number of challenges received due to the following reasons: 
• Failure of the decryption process in the Tee. 
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• The decryption process exceeding the maximum time specified by 
STANAG-4193 [2J to decrypt the challenge in the Tee. 
3.5.1.2 TCC-TxP Operation Sequence 
Figure 3.10 shows the process of signalling and timing when an IFF mode 4 
challenge is being passed to the Tee with a request to decrypt from the TxP. 
The mode 4 interrogation challenge characteristics shown in Figure 3.5 are still 
applicable to this process. 
Pi P2 P3 P4 PS 01 032 
! 
"",:,',"1 Trigg" E"'~. 
n. ===========~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ I 199.S:Hl.75 = "' f< '"';;" >-1 ------,l~j.15 -----n~ ~~------L------------~ 
-.3j.15m1n 
Ij.l5max 
Figure 3.10 : IFF secure mode 4 interrogation decryption sequence. The Tee 
receives the challenge from the TxP, and if a trigger enable signal is present during 
the period of the pulse P4, the Tee must attempt to decrypt and provide the 
decryption result in a time less than 199.5 ± 0.75 .... s. The decryption result is a replay 
delay as described in Section 3.4.1.3. The Tee must produce a disparity pulse if the 
challenge decryption has failed . 
3.5.2 IFF TCC Requirements 
The following subsections present the requirements allocated to the emulated 
IFF Tee. 
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3.5.2.1 TCC Processing Rate 
Requirement: 
The maximum number of IFF challenges that the Tee shall process is 3000 
challenges per second, which is in compliance with paragraph 1.6.3 of 
Appendix 3 of STANAG-4193 [2]. 
3.5.2.2 Mode 4 Enable Trigger 
The enable trigger signal is generated by the TxP to inform the Tee that it 
must process the challenge being passed to it, as seen in Figure 3.10. 
Requirement: 
The Tee shall validate that the following occurred, in compliance with 
paragraph 1.6.2 of Appendix 3 of STANAG-4193 [2]: 
a) The enable trigger pulse was preceded by the P4 pulse of the 
challenge by 0.45 ± 0.05 J.ls. 
b) The rising edge of the enable trigger occurred within the P4 time 
period. 
3.5.2.3 Mode 4 Disparity Output 
The Tee must generate what is known as a 'late disparity pulse' upon failure 
of the decryption of a mode 4 interrogation. Paragraph 1.7.2.1 of Appendix 3 
of STANAG-4193 [2] calls for an early disparity pulse, which is generated, for 
example, in the presence of a P5 pulse or an All pulse error in the challenge. 
However, the emulated Tee will not have to implement such an early 
disparity pulse since the emulated TxP (specified in Section 3.4) is able to 
validate mode 4 challenges, including side-lobe suppression situations and All 
pulse errors. 
Requirements: 
a) The duration of the disparity signal output from the Tee to the TxP 
shall have the minimum and maximum duration of 0.3 J.ls and 1 J.ls 
respectively, in compliance with paragraph 1.5.1 of Appendix 3 of 
ST ANAG-4193 [2]. 
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b) The disparity signal shall occur 198 ± 2 Ils after the occurrence of the 
rising edge of the enable trigger pulse, as described in Section 3.4.2.5, 
in compliance with paragraph 1.5.1 of Appendix 3 of STANAG-4193 
[2]. 
3.5.2.4 TCC Mode 4 Processing Time and Reply Delay 
When the TCC is requested to decrypt a received mode 4 challenge and to 
provide the reply position embedded in the challenge, it should do so within a 
certain time frame. The TxP requirements listed under Section 3.4.2.10 must 
be taken into consideration when examining the requirements below. 
Requirement: 
When a successful decryption is performed, the decrypted reply value is 
measured in microseconds, starting from 0 IlS to 60 IlS, which represents a 
reply position in one of sixteen possible positions in multiples of 4 ± 0.1 Ils. 
This position shall be available to the TxP 199.5 ± 0.75 Ils after the 
occurrence of the P4 interrogation pulse rising edge, in compliance with 
paragraphs 4.3.1.5.2 and 4.4.3 of Appendix 3 of STANAG-4193 [2]. 
3.6 FRUIT and Garbled Replies Concept Summaries and 
Requirements 
For the system to generate FRUIT and garbled replies, according to the user 
requirements set out in Chapter 2, it is necessary to understand how these 
replies occur. The concept summaries below explore the role played by the 
existence of multiple interrogators in the region near the interrogator being 
tested, and the role played by multiple targets in FRUIT and garbling 
situations. Thereafter, the FRUIT and garble manager requirements are 
allocated. 
3.6.1 FRUIT Replies Concept Summary 
In SSRIIFF interrogator systems, FRUIT occur when a number of 
interrogators operate in close proximity to each other [3] [4]. In such a 
situation, TxPs generate replies, which are received and considered as FRUIT 
by other interrogators because they were not expected, i.e. they were not 
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responses to their own interrogations. FRUIT replies not identified as FRUIT 
may indicate targets at incorrect ranges [3] [4]. FRUIT is applicable to all the 
SSRlIFF interrogation modes supported by the target emulator. 
Because of the arrival of asynchronous FRUIT replies, the interrogator signal 
processor should be able to "de-FRUIT" those replies to a certain extent, as 
specified by STANAG-4193 [2], to be around 20,000 FRUIT replies per 
second (2). The term de-FRUIT in the context of STANAG-4193 [2] refers to 
an interrogator function, which de-correlates the FRUIT replies and prevents 
them from being identified as real targets. Interrogators can use different 
techniques to de-FRUIT replies, such as staggering the PRior keeping track 
of a number of previous target replies. Figure 3.11 shows an example of 
FRUIT replies to which SSRIIFF interrogators may be exposed. 
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Figure 3.11 : Example of a FRUIT situation in SSRlIFF. Interrogator A and 8 operate 
at different PRF rates and are located in close proximity to each other. It is assumed 
that the interrogators have a fixed direction antenna or that they happen to be 
rotating in a manner that allows their beams to illuminate a target at the same time. 
The reply 81 to interrogation 81 will cause a FRUIT effect to be seen by interrogator 
A, and if interrogator A did not have de-FRUIT facilities , it will assume that there is a 
target at a further range from the actual target over a number of PRFs. The same 
applies to reply A2 being seen by interrogator 8 for only the first PRF. This does not 
apply to reply A1 to interrogation A1, however, as the reply receive window for 
interrogator 8 was closed when the reply A1 was generated. 
3.6.2 Garbled Replies Concept Summary 
In SSRlIFF, garbled replies occur when TxP replies from two or more targets 
overlap in time, which may cause ambiguity in their decoding process at the 
inlerrogalor [2J [3J. Garbling occurs when two targets are at the same or at a 
close radial range from the interrogator, but at different altitudes [3J. The time 
tolerance allowed by STANAG-4193 [2J for TxPs to produce a reply also 
influences the ambiguity of the interpretation of the replies when targets are 
43 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
close to each other (for example, the tolerance can be ± 0.1 Jls for the SIF 
modes, see Section 3.4.2.11). 
Garbling can happen in all SSRIIFF modes specified by the user requirements 
in Chapter 2. Figure 3.12 shows two examples of situations where garbling 
may occur. 
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Figure 3.12 : Examples of garbling. In case 1, interrogator A is busy interrogating the 
sector containing target Y, but at the same time interrogator B is interrogating the 
sector containing target X, which happens to be at the same radial distance from 
interrogator A as target Y. The replies from target X to interrogations from 
interrogator 8 may be received by the side-lobes of interrogator A antenna, and 
these will then overlap with the replies from target Y. De-garble and de-FRUIT 
facilities in interrogators shouk1 handle problems like this over a number of replies 
and as the targets vary in range. 
In case 2, two targets are also at the same range from interrogator A, but they are at 
different altitudes, which will result in an overlap in their replies. 
The cha llenge-reply at the bottom of the figure is an example of what the overlapping 
in the replies would look like in both cases. Replies may overlap on a pulse-by-pulse 
level, thus resulting in wide pulses, like pulse 84 from target X combined with pulse 
C4 from taiget Y; alternatively, the ambiguity could result from trying to identify which 
pulses belong to which F1-F2 reply group. For instance, the pulse following F1-Y 
could be A1 from target X or C1 from target Y. 
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3.6.3 FRUIT and Garble Requirements 
The following subsections present the requirements allocation in respect of 
FRUIT and garble reply generation. 
3.6.3.1 Multiple Interrogator Emulation 
For the system to create FRUIT replies, it needs to emulate the existence of 
multiple interrogators operating in close proximity and causing FRUIT effects. 
Requirement: 
The system shall be able to emulate the generation of interrogations from 0 to 
2 SSR/IFF interrogators, which are all equipped with ICCs, and to support 
modes 1, 2, 3/A, C and 4. The interrogators shall furthermore operate within 
the simulated target ranges, derived from the summary presented in Section 
3.6.1, and in compliance with the user requirements as itemised in Section 
2.1.9. These emulated interrogators shall further be compliant with STANAG-
4193 [2] timing requirements. 
3.6.3.2 Garbled Replies Allowance 
Garbled reply situations can be created by situating targets in the same, or 
close, simulated range from the interrogator being tested. 
Requirement: 
The system shall allow for the variable programming of emulated target 
ranges, which are derived from the summary set out in Section 3.6.2. 
3.7 Interrogator Concept Summary and Requirements 
The subsections below summarise the concept of the digital timing 
characteristics that are relevant to SSRlIFF interrogators; thereafter, the 
requirements in respect of the emulated IFF interrogators are allocated. The 
emulation of interrogators is necessary to satisfy the abovementioned FRUIT 
and garbled reply requirements. 
3.7.1 SSRlIFF Interrogator Concept Summary 
The following subsections analyse the operational, timing and functional 
characteristics related to SSRIIFF interrogators. 
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3.7.1.1 55R1IFF Interrogator Operation 
In an SSRIIFF system, the interrogator is typically coupled with a primary 
radar, and it is used to identify targets by generating interrogations to the 
TxPs attached to those targets. To generate secure mode 4 challenges, an 
ICC must be connected to the interrogator. 
Interrogator reply processing falls outside the scope of this study, as the main 
aim of this project is to provide SSRIIFF replies to an interrogator signal 
processor that is being tested. 
The concept summaries in Sections 3.4.1.1 and 3.4.1.2 above, including the 
tables and diagrams, as well as Section 3.4.1.3 in respect of the TxP are also 
applicable to the emulated interrogator. In situations where the TxP is 
required to validate the timing of received interrogations, the emulated 
interrogator must also adhere to the same timing requirements when 
generating interrogations. It should be noted that the actual processing of 
secure mode 4 replies and the determination of the target friendliness 
confidence level form part of the interrogator signal processing tasks and 
consequently also fall outside the scope of this project (recall Figure 1.1 in 
respect of the top level project scope). 
3.7.2 55R1IFF Interrogator Requirements 
The following subsections present the requirements allocation for the 
emulated SSRlIFF interrogator. 
3.7.2.1 Interrogation Modes 
Requirement: 
The interrogator shall be able to generate SSRlIFF interrogations in modes 1, 
2, 3/A, C and in secure mode 4 if an emulated ICC is connected thereto. This 
complies with the user requirement set out in Section 2.1.9. 
3.7.2.2 Interaction with an ICC 
The emulated interrogators must be able to request challenges from the ICC, 
in order to send them out to the emulated TxPs and TCCs to create FRUIT 
mode 4 replies. 
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Requirement: 
The interrogator shall be able to request encrypted IFF challenges from the 
ICC by generating Pre-Trigger (PT) signals whose timing characteristics are 
compatible with the ICC requirements as discussed in Section 3.8.2.3 below. 
3.7.2.3 Interrogation Repetition Rate 
STANAG-4193 [2] limits the maximum number of interrogations an 
interrogator can generate per second, and it recommends operation at the 
lowest practical rate. The purpose of this is most likely to help minimize the 
amount of challenges and replies in space, and to allow TxP and interrogator 
signal processors to perform their housekeeping tasks between 
i nterrogations/repli es. 
Requirement: 
In compliance with paragraph 3.2.5 in STANAG-419 [2], the interrogator shall 
not generate more than 450 interrogations per second for all SSRIIFF modes. 
3.8 ICC Concept Summary and Requirements 
The main purpose of the SSRIIFF target emulator is to provide replies to an 
interrogator being tested; however, the emulator must also be able to create 
effects caused by other interrogators operating in the area. Recalling Figure 
3.1, the emulation of IFF ICCs is necessary in order to emulate secure mode 
4 challenges. This is needed to cause FRUIT and garbled mode 4 replies. 
The subsections below present an ICC relevant concept summary of 
cryptographic and digital timing characteristics, followed by a listing of the 
requirements in respect of the emulated ICC. 
3.8.1 IFF ICC Concept Summary 
To meet relevant aspects of the user requirements, the following subsection 
analyses the related IFF ICC operational and functional characteristics and 
timing requirements, which the system must adhere to in accordance with 
STANAG-4193, especially Appendix 3 of Annex A [2]. 
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3.8.1 .1 ICC-Interrogator Operation Sequence 
Figure 3.13 below depicts the signalling sequence and timing of a secure 
mode 4 challenge request made by the interrogator to the ICC, followed by 
the generation of the challenge, and the reply delay to be expected by the 
interrogator if a successful decryption of the challenge is completed by the 
TCC. 
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Figure 3.13 : IFF secure mode 4 interrogator to ICC interaction. The interrogator 
requests an encrypted challenge from the ICC by sending a Pre-Trigger (PT) pulse; 
the ICC responds with the sync pulse group and the encrypted challenge. For the 
interrogator to be aware of when to expect the reply from a friendly TxP, it needs to 
know the delay value encrypted in the challenge as described in Figure 3.6, and for 
that, it queries the ICC by sending the Reply Video (RV) pulse. The delay measured 
until the ICC generates the Time Decoded Video (TDV) pulse is equivalent to the 
encrypted delay. 
3.8.2 IFF ICC Requirements 
The following sUbsections present the requirements in respect of the 
emulated IFF ICC. 
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3.8.2.1 ICC Processing Rate 
Requirement: 
The ICC shall be able to accept a maximum of 1800 Pre-Triggers (or 
challenge requests) per second. This is in compliance with paragraph 2.5.1 of 
Appendix 3 of STANAG-4193 [2]. 
3.8.2.2 Reply Video to Time Decoded Video Encrypted Delay 
As depicted in Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.13, the interrogator must know when to 
expect the mode 4 reply from friendly aircrafts for a specific interrogation 
generated by the ICC. The interrogator will thus send a signal referred to as 
Reply Video (RV) to the ICC. The delay embedded in the encrypted challenge 
is measured by the interrogator, which refers to the time between sending the 
RV to the instant when the ICC produces the signal Time Decoded Video 
(TDV). 
Recall Figure 3.8, Sections 3.4.2.10 and 3.5.1.1 above, which summarise the 
concept and set out the requirements connected to the possible sixteen delay 
positions. 
Requirement: 
In compliance with paragraph 2.10.2 of Appendix 3 of STANAG-4193 [2], the 
delay between the RV and the TDV signal shall not be greater than 2.5 Jls in 
which to indicate a reply in the last reply position, and up to a maximum 
duration of 60 JlS for a reply in the first reply position. 
3.8.2.3 Pre-Trigger CPT) Pulse Width Validation 
Requirement: 
The ICC shall validate the pulse width of the received Pre-Trigger pulse, and 
accept pulses with a minimum duration of 0.5 Jls and a maximum duration of 
10.0 Jls, in compliance with the relevant aspects of paragraph 2.5.1 of 
Appendix 3 of STANAG-4193 [2]. 
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3.8.2.4 Reply Video (RV) Pulse Width Validation 
Requirement: 
The ICC shall validate the pulse width of the received RV pulse and accept 
pulses with a minimum duration of 0.4 /lS and a maximum duration of 0.6 /ls, 
in compliance with relevant aspects of paragraph 2.9 of Appendix 3 of 
STANAG-4193 [2]. 
3.8.2.5 Time Decoded Video (TDV) Pulse Interval 
Requirement: 
The ICC shall generate the TDV pulse with a minimum duration of 0.3 /ls and 
a maximum duration of 0.7 /ls, in compliance with relevant aspects of 
paragraph 2.10.1 of Appendix 3 of STANAG-4193 [2]. 
3.9 Target Identity Generator Concept Summary and 
Requirements 
In order for the system to create and maintain distinct targets, some target 
parameters need to be made available to the user for configuration. The 
sections below list requirements for the target configuration parameters and 
for the minimum number of emulated targets required. 
3.9.1 Target Identity Generator Requirements 
The following subsections present the requirements allocation in respect of 
the target identity generator. 
3.9.1.1 Target Configuration Parameters 
Requirements: 
In order for the system user to create an SSRlIFF target, the following target 
parameters shall be configurable and maintained by the system once 
configured: 
a) Target range (from the interrogator being tested). 
b) Target range change rate, i.e. the speed of the approaching target or of 
the target travelling away from the interrogator being tested. 
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c) Target azimuth, i.e. the range of ACP pulses in which the target is 
illuminated. 
d) Target azimuth change rate, i.e. the azimuth change for the next 
antenna rotation. 
e) Target TxP-TCC pair A, B, C and D codes as described in Table 3.11, 
M4 key, interrogation modes enable/disable control, SPI and 
emergency enable/disable control. 
3.9.1.2 Number of Targets 
Requirement: 
The system shall be able to emulate and maintain from 0 to at least 1,500 
targets in a single antenna sweep; these targets may be evenly distributed in 
a 360 0 space. 
3.10 Target Mobility Manager Concept Summary and Requirements 
In order for the SSRIIFF emulator to provide emulated targets in motion that 
reply to interrogations from the interrogator being tested, or from the FRUIT 
interrogators discussed in Section 3.6, it is necessary to understand target 
mobility in both range and azimuth from the SSRIIFF perspective, in order to 
specify what the system should do or what must be available to the user for 
configuration. The subsections below present a target mobility concept 
summary and a list of the requirements derived from this concept summary. 
3.10.1 Target Mobility Manager Concept Summary 
The subsections below analyse the following: 
• Antenna interface ACP/ARP pulses 
• The relation between target range and interrogator PRF 
• Target illumination time and ACP count relation 
• Target angular velocity and ACP count relation. 
The aim by looking at these topics is to explain how targets will change in 
azimuth and range, and how this will need to be incorporated in the system 
design. 
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3.10.1.1 Antenna Interface ACP/ARP Pulses 
The SSRIIFF antenna will provide azimuth information for 360 0 by generating 
a train of pulses known as Azimuth Change Pulses (ACP), which consist of 
4096 pulses in the case of the antenna provided by the user. The pulse count 
determines the angle of the antenna with a precision obtained by dividing 
360 0 by the number of ACP pulses. The Azimuth Reference Pulse (ARP) is a 
reset pulse, which indicates a new count of ACP pulses, which in turn 
indicates a new antenna rotation. 
0° / ARP / ACPO 
I I 
I , 
, I 
\ I 
\ I \ I" \'" ;;' 
...... _-_ ...... 
Figure 3.14 : The ACP pulse count represents the azimuth of the antenna, where the 
azimuth increases with every ACP pulse in a precision obtained by dividing the 360 0 
over the fixed number of pulses. The ARP pulse is used to reset the ACP pulses 
count and occurs at the beginning of each new antenna rotation. 
The interrogator processor being tested will use the ACP count provided by 
the antenna as a means of determining the target bearing. The spacing 
between ACP counts is dependent on the antenna rotation period as follows: 
Antenna Rotation Period 
ACP spacing = . ACP Counts per rotatwn 
(3.2) 
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Figure 3.15 : ACP spacing is the time between two ACP pulses 
The system must interface with or simulate an antenna with a rotation period 
of 8 seconds and an ACP count of 4096, therefore: 
8s 
ACP Spacing = 4096 = 1.95 ms 
(3.3) 
During a certain ACP count, the interrogator will assume that any received 
replies are from targets at the same fixed azimuth until the next ACP count is 
received, whereafter the azimuth is increased, and so on. 
3.10.1.2 Target Range and Interrogator PRF 
The system is required to emulate targets from 0 to 600 km in range. In order 
for an interrogator to detect targets at such a distance of 600km, a PRI of at 
least 4 ms is required, and a 3 IJS TxP processing time is added for SIF 
modes and 202 IJs in mode 4. This PRI is required to accommodate the two-
way trip of the challenge/reply operation. An example of a calculation for SIF 
modes using Equation 3.1 shows that the time interval between interrogations 
would be: 
600Km 
PRJ = * 2 + TxP Delay = 4.003 ms 
c 
(3.4) 
Where C is the speed of light. This PRI will force the interrogator to have a 
PRF of at least 250 Hz. 
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3.10.1.3 Target Illumination Time and ACP Count Relation 
The system must interface with or simulate an antenna with an EBW of 5° and 
a rotation period of 8 seconds. In terms of Section 3.10.1.2 above, the PRF of 
the interrogator is 250 Hz, and it has an EBW of 5° (a 360° space can be 
divided into 72 sectors of 5° each). The target illumination time for an 
assumed stationary target with an antenna rotation time of 8 seconds will be: 
8s 
Target Illumination Time = 72 = 111 ms 
(3.5) 
While a target is located in the EBW, it can be interrogated with a number of 
interrogations, calculated as follows: 
Number of Interrogations in EBW = PRF * Target Illumination Time 
Number of Interrogations in EBW = 250 * Illms = 28 Interrogations 
(3.6) 
(3.7) 
The ACP pulses count from the antenna in 8 seconds is 4096, which equates 
to 512 pulses per second; therefore, the number of ACP pulse changes during 
the illumination time is calculated as follows: 
ACP Pulses During Illumination = 111 ms * 512 = 56.32 pulses (3.8) 
Based on the above, it is clear that the emulator needs to make targets 
available based on the current ACP pulse count provided by the antenna or 
generated internally. The validity of targets during certain ACP pulse counts 
needs to be configurable, in order to interface with or simulate antennas with 
different EBWs and rotation periods. Figure 3.16 presents a graphical 
representation of the above. 
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Figure 3.16 : The emulated target labelled ~X· is assumed to be stationary and to be 
located in the illumination area of the 5" EBW antenna, which is rotating once every 
8 seconds, thus resulting in an illumination time of 111 ms. The target will be 
illuminated for approximately 56 ACP pulses, based on a 4096 ACP pulse count 
antenna. The target will receive approximately 28 interrogations while illuminated. 
3.10.1.4 Target Angular Velocity and ACP Count Relation 
In the next antenna rotation, after being detected in the first, the azimuth 
range of a target travelling in a ci rcle around the interrogator will depend on 
the target's angular velocity and range, as seen in the target illumination 
summary in Section 3.10.1.3 above and Figure 3.16. The azimuth will change 
at a lower rate for a target at a further range from the interrogator than fo r a 
target that is at a closer range. Angular velocity w is defined as: 
v 
w= -
r 
(3.9) 
Where v is the linear velocity and r is the radius. For a target travelling at 200 
rnIs and at a range of 600 km, the angular veloci ty is: 
200m/s 
w = 600Km = 3.33.-4 rad/s 
(3.10) 
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To calculate the azimuth change in degrees, the result is multiplied by 180 to 
rr 
obtain a result of 0.019°/s. For an antenna providing 4096 ACP pulses for 
360°, an ACP pulse equivalence in degrees is calculated by dividing 360° by 
4096, thus resulting in 0.087°. For an antenna rotating once every 8 seconds, 
the azimuth change in degrees will be calculated by multiplying 0.019°/s by 8, 
resulting in a change of 0.152° in 8 seconds. The azimuth change rate in ACP 
is what will finally be used by the emulator; it is calculated by dividing the 
azimuth change in 8 seconds by the azimuth change in one ACP as follows: 
0.152 
Change in ACPs = 0.087 = 1.74 ACPs 
(3.11 ) 
In accordance with the above example, the emulator must move the target 
ACP range by around 2 ACP pulses for every new antenna rotation, as 
illustrated in Figure 3.17 below. 
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Figure 3.17 : Recalling Figure 3.16, the emulated target labelled MX· is travelling in a 
uniform circle and is at a range of 600km from the interrogator with an angular 
velocity of 3.33e-4 rad /s, based on Equation 4.9. The target will change in azimuth 
by 0.152" for the next antenna rotation in 8 seconds, resulting in a shift in the ACP 
pulses range by approximately 2, based on Equation 4.10. 
3.10.2 Target Mobility Manager Requirements 
The following subsections present the requirements allocation in respect of 
the target mobility manager. 
3.10.2.1 Antenna ACPfARP Interface and Simulation 
Requirements: 
The system shall be able to: 
a) Accept TTL ACPfARP pulses from an SSRlIFF antenna providing 4096 
ACP counts per rotation. 
b) Generate the ACPfARP pulses in the absence of the abovementioned 
antenna. 
c) Make the azimuth range of emulated targets configurable for the 
simulation of different target behaviour, range and speed. 
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3.10.2.2 Antenna Variation 
Requirement: 
The system shall be able to interface with antennas with different rotation 
periods, ACP pulse counts and EBWs. More specifically, however, the system 
must demonstrate its capability for a 5° EBW antenna. 
3.11 Continuous Operation Manager Concept Summary and 
Requirements 
The user requires the system to operate in a continuous live mode. In this 
mode, interrogation/reply parameters must be able to change on-the-fly 
without it being necessary to restart the system. The system must furthermore 
ensure that the system user has live access to the emulated targets, 
interrogators, TxPs and TCCs. 
3.11.1 Continuous Operation Manager Requirements 
The subsection below presents the requirements allocation in respect of the 
continuous operation manager. 
3.11.1.1 Target Range and Existence 
Requirements: 
The system shall allow the followi ng: 
a) Emulated targets shall be allowed to travel towards the interrogator 
being tested, i.e. the reply delay will decrease as the emulated target 
comes closer to the interrogator until the minimum simulated range, 
before it travels away until the maximum range, and so on, to allow for 
continuous operation regardless of the duration of the test. 
b) Emulated FRUIT interrogator parameters shall be allowed to change 
during a test without it being necessary to restart the test. This is also 
applicable to the emulated TxPs and TCCs. 
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3.12 Real-Time Operation Manager Concept Summary and 
Requirements 
The target emulator system is required to operate in real time, in the sense 
that replies from emulated targets in response to interrogations from the 
interrogator being tested, or from emulated FRUIT interrogators, must always 
be proportional to the emulated target's range and the target's angular 
velocity. Furthermore, the timing requirements must be in accordance with 
STANAG-4193 [2] for TxP-TCC processing times. 
Aspects contributing to the ability of the system to operate in real time are 
discussed in all the above-mentioned project subsystem concept summaries 
covered in this chapter. The real-time requirement will thus automatically be 
satisfied when all the timing requirements are satisfied for all the subsystems. 
3.13 ITRC Interface Requirements 
The ITRC is an RF SSR/IFF test transceiver card that is currently being 
developed by another Masters student in the RRSG at UCT; it is being 
designed to provide an RF level input/output interface to the interrogator being 
tested. The ITRC should be able to interface with SSRIIFF related laboratory 
equipment, including the SSR/IFF target emulator. The SSR/IFF emulator 
design is required to create an interface point for the ITRC. 
Requirement: 
The system shall provide an interface point for the ITRC, which will allow it to 
use the target emulator as a digital back-end. 
3.14 HW Interface Requirements 
Input/output TTL pins are available on the target HW board, and should be 
used as the interface with the interrogator being tested. 
Requirements: 
The SSRlIFF target emulator shall make the following signals available for 
testing and integration purposes: 
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Table 3.14 : SSRlIFF emulator input/output signals 
Signal Description Direction 
ACP Pulses ACPs received from an SSRlIFF inpuVoutput 
antenna or generated by the system 
ARP Pulses ARPs received from an SSRlIFF input/output 
antenna or generated by the system 
OSP External Memory EM1F· A dock may be used to output 
Interface A External synchronize several parts of the 
Memory Interface system, vmich will be covered in the 
(EM IF-A) clock design chapter 
Combined Interrogations received from the input/output 
interrogations interrogator being tested combined 
with FRUIT interrogations generated 
by the system 
ACP count 121ines to represenl4096 ACP output 
coont 
Combined Replies Combined replies generated by all output 
emulated targets 
3.15 User Requirements Traceability Matrix 
Table 7.1 in Appendix A represents a traceability matrix, which maps the user 
requirements itemised and discussed in Chapter 2 against the requirements 
set out in this chapter. One of the benefits of this mapping is that it proves that 
all the user requirements have been covered, thereby ensuring that every 
user requirement has been analysed and that further requirements have been 
derived and allocated to satiSfy them. 
3.16 Summary 
The above chapter began by presenting a system block diagram of the 
SSRlIFF emulator, based on an analysis of the user requirements contained 
in the preceding chapter. For each subsystem in this diagram, a concept 
summary was presented and requirements were allocated. A link to the user 
requirements traceability matrix was provided at the end of the chapter. The 
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following chapter will present the detailed design of the system and the 
tradeoffs that were necessary in order to implement it. 
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4. Chapter 4: System Design 
The following chapter presents the design of the SSORlIFF emulator. The two 
main computers on the target HW provided by the -user are an FPGA and a 
DSP. The computers are presented in a target HW fX)verview section, which is 
followed by a top·level concept design summary. Ceertain parts of the design 
are partitioned over the DSP or the FPGA. The tradeoffs and reasoning 
behind the partition ing wi ll also be presented. A detsailed design of Ihe FPGA 
and DSP parts of the system will be covered in depthn later in the chapter. 
4.1 Target HW Overview 
The Quixote board (8) shown in Figure 2.1 contain .. , two main computers, a 
Texas Instruments TMS320C6416 DSP and ea six-millionijate Xilinx 
XC2V6000 Virtexll FPGA. On-board memories availeable are a 32 MB SDRAM 
and an 8 MB ZBT SBSRAM. 
lUT 
FPGA XCIV 1000 ,~ .. '" 
5Il1WA 
(3MI) JTAG 
TMlS32OC6416DSP 
tS -00 MKI·4800MIPSJ 
_ ....
. 
EMfa 
Figure 4.1 : From [1 4]. The two main computers on the CQuixote board are the Xilinx 
XC2V6000 Virtex ll FPGA and the Texas Instruments (TI) TMS320C6416 DSP. 
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4.2 SSRlIFF Emulator Top-Level Block Diagram 
Figure 4.2 illustrates a top~level diagram of the system. 
Iff 1n1tn'Of11Of 5SiVlff [mu~lor 
---
--""-
., II.'" 
--
~ 
.-
-"~.""",, 
... 
_.-
, ....... -
-
-
--:.- L -;.;.,-;...!L... ____________ ..I 
""-
""-lSI: '~~'-
" ,--"-"""''-1lK : 1If __ 
UIIl'_oI--. ..... 
Figure 4.2 : SSRlIFF target emulator top~level block diagram. The emulator oonsists 
of a group of TxPs and TCGs representing targets at different ranges and azimuths, 
with different reply codes. Targets are managed by the Emulated Targets Manager, 
depending on where the antenna of the interrogator being tested is pointing, i.e. the 
personality and location of each Txp-TCC pair changes, depending on the current 
ACP count. See description of concepts in Section 4.3 below. The range function 
blocks connected to the output of each TxP-TCC pair (labelled Ftx(» are responsible 
for delaying the reply, depending on the range of the emulated target. The dotted box 
in the top left comer of the emulator represents the internal interrogator-ICC pairs 
responsible for the FRUIT generation capability of the system. Combined (using an 
OR function) replies from the system are made available at a single output point. 
RFIIF is being bypassed and the challenge/reply operations are done in TIL. A DSP 
will be used to implement the Emulated Targets Manager, whereas the rest of the 
blocks will be implemented on an FPGA. The ITRC has a possible point of interface 
with the system via the Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) bus, as will be 
discussed in Section 4.4.2 below. 
4.3 SSRlIFF Emulator Concept Design Summary 
The design concept exploits the relatively slow timing characteristics of 
SSR/IFF systems, where antenna rotations are measured in seconds, and 
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interrogation repetition rates are capped by STANAG4193 [2] and are typically 
measured in milliseconds. This allows sufficient computing time for a DSP 
running on a 1 GHz clock, and an FPGA running on a 100 MHz clock. The 
design is based on using only eight TxP-TCC pairs, which reside in the FPGA, 
to emulate thousands of targets, exceeding the 1500 targets required by the 
user. The eight TxP-TCC pairs are divided into two groups each comprising 
four pairs, between which received interrogations will ping-pong. TxP-TCC 
pairs in the FPGA are fully configurable and are made available as 
asynchronous memory interfaced to the DSP. On the DSP, the registers of 
the TXP-TCC pairs are recognised as asynchronous memory and are defined 
in such a way that they are available for TxP-TCC configuration by the SW 
running on the DSP. 
The personalities of the TxP-TCC pairs are updated by the DSP, based on 
interrupts from the FPGA when an ACP/ARP pulse is detected. After an ACP 
count is read by the DSP, it is used to access a look-up table, managed by 
the DSP, which resides in the SDRAM, and contains the relevant 
configuration information of the targets (Le. reply codes, ranges, the target's 
presence in current azimuth, mode 4 cryptography keys, etc.) This 
configuration information is used to update the personalities of the eight TxP-
TCC pairs. 
The look-up table in the SDRAM is mirrored, and a ping-pong operation is 
carried out between the two tables by the DSP. This operation is triggered by 
the occurrence of an ARP pulse interrupt indicating the completion of an 
antenna rotation. This allows the DSP to use the spare time between 
ACP/ARP interrupts (milliseconds for ACP and seconds for ARP) to calculate 
changes in the positions and ranges of targets for the subsequent antenna 
rotation, and to update that information in one of the look-up tables while the 
other table is being used to update the FPGA. 
FRUIT and garbled replies are created by placing four configurable emulated 
interrogator transmitters and ICCs on the FPGA. The DSP is able to select the 
FRUIT interrogator's interrogation modes and PRFs. 
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In order for replies from the targets to be delayed based on their range, TxPs 
use First In First Out (FIFO) memories in the FPGA to store their generated 
reply for a specified period of time. This time period is calculated based on the 
target's range, the duration of the two-way interrogation/reply and the TxP 
processing time. The following subsections will expand on the aspects 
discussed in the above summary. 
4.4 Design Partitioning Decisions 
The subsections below describe the partitioning of the design units, which 
enables them to run on the two major computing engines on the board. The 
relevant choices regarding partitioning are explained and justified where 
needed. 
4.4.1 FPGA Partition 
According to the timing requirements for TxPs, CCs and interrogators 
presented in Chapter 3, SSRlIFF pulse widths and durations need to comply 
with timing within a range of between 450 ns to 800 ns, and they must be able 
to detect tolerance margins as low as 50 ns. The multi target system 
requirement was the reason behind the design decision to place multi target 
instances in the Virtexll FPGA, as it is suitable for handling a minimum clock 
speed of 40 MHz (which is required to detect a 50 ns transition) and multiple 
instances of functional blocks in parallel. Interfacing with the antenna of the 
interrogator being tested via the ACP/ARP signals is also handled by the 
FPGA, which allows dedicated Circuitry to monitor the ACP/ARP lines and to 
emulate their presence if an antenna is not provided by the user. 
Due to the system's target range requirement, replies from targets must be 
delayed before being sent out to the interrogator being tested. FIFOs on the 
FPGA have thus been chosen to store the replies until they are sent out, since 
the XC2V6000 Virtexll device is considered memory rich with a maximum 
RAM of 2,592 Kbits [13]. 
4.4.2 DSP Partition 
The multiple distinct identity targets, target mobility and system continuous 
operation requirements are management and control orientated, which 
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necessitates intensive calculations to be made continuously in order to update 
target locations and identities. This is suitable for the TI TMS320C6416 DSP, 
as it runs on a 1 GHz clock. The decision to allocate target management 
functions to the DSP has been influenced by the relative simplicity of C code 
programming and the enhanced debugging capabilities on the DSP in Code 
Composer Studio (CCS). CCS is the Integrated Development Environment 
(IDE) from TI. The possible inclusion of an interface with a host PC over the 
PCI bus as a future expansion of this project is an additional motivation for 
placing target management functions on the DSP. A future expansion may 
include the development of a sophisticated PC application with a Graphical 
User Interface (GUI) in order to create mobile target scenarios and to allow 
the information to be sent from the PC to the DSP, which is available on the 
PCI bus. The outputs of the interrogator processor may then be compared 
with the mobile target scenarios, in order to create a more advanced 
interrogator testing capability. The availability of the DSP on the PCI bus also 
allows for a possible interface point for the ITRC. 
4.5 SSRlIFF Target Emulator FPGA Detailed Design 
Figure 4.4 presents the FPGA design for the system. Data is exchanged 
between the FPGA and the DSP via an asynchronous memory interface, 
which utilises 128 read/write registers. These registers are used by the DSP 
to configure and change the personalities and locations of the eight TxP-CC 
pairs, to configure the FRUIT interrogators for the interrogation modes and 
PRFs, and to enable/disable and acknowledge interrupts. Registers read by 
the DSP are also used to check an interrupt cause, as in Table 4.2, and to 
read the current antenna position indicated by the ACP count, as in Table 4.1. 
The registers are defined in Table 4.8. 
The DSP asynchronous memory interface clock is provided to the FPGA, and 
it is used to clock the design. The antenna position interface and emulation 
block is responsible for interfacing with an SSR/IFF antenna, or emulating it 
by supplying ACP/ARP pulses to the rest of the system and the current ACP 
count to the DSP. 
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Table 4.1: Antenna ACP Count (ACPC) register bits allocation 
I ! 1 12 111 0 
Reserved ACP Count 0 - 4095 
The interrupts controller block accepts interrupt requests from the antenna 
interface block and multiplexes the interrupt requests to one line connected to 
the DSP external interrupt pin . This design provides the DSP with a register to 
write to that either allows or masks specific interrupt types from causing an 
interrupt request. A register to dear interrupts is used by the DSP to 
acknowledge an interrupt after reading an interrupt pending register, which 
indicates the cause of the interrupt. Once all interrupts have been 
acknowledged, the interrupts controller deactivates the interrupt line to the 
DSP. 
Table 4.2: Interrupt Pending Reg ister (IPR) bits allocation 
7 I 6 I 5 I 4 I 3 I 2 1 0 
ARP ACP Increment 
Reserved Interrupt Interrupt 
15 I 14 I 13 I 12 I 11 I 10 9 8 
Reserved 
23 I 22 I 21 I 20 I 19 I 18 17 16 
Reserved 
31 I 30 I 29 I 28 I 27 I 26 25 24 
Reserved 
Eight TxP-TCC pairs (divided into two groups) are used to receive 
interrogations in a ping-pong manner toggled by ACP pulses. The ping-pong 
architecture is used to satisfy the system requirement for maximum target 
range, and will ensure that the TxP-TCC pair, which is busy processing an 
interrogation and delaying the reply (depending on the target range) is 
allowed a twice the time delay between two ACP pulses pulses before it is 
requested to process another interrogation. During such time, the group not 
processing interrogations becomes available after the occurrence of the 
second ACP pulse. See Figure 4.3 below for an illustration of this. 
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ACP ACP ACP ACP 
11 n n Il-
UMTkP-TCCP .... A UM t..P.TCC P.1ts 8 I I UMTxP-TCCF>.nA 
Figure 4.3 : Eight TxP-TCC pairs are divided into two groups, A and 8. They are 
used to receive interrogations in a ping-pong manner, toggled by ACP pulses. 
The DSP application is unaware of the mirroring. and assumes the existence 
of only four TxP· TCe pairs, according to which the configuration registers 
connected to the first four pairs are also connected to the second four in the 
same manner. For the antenna with an 8 5 rotation period and 4096 ACPs/s 
(specified by the user), the duration of time between ACPs is around 1.95 ms, 
as shown in Equation 3.3, and 3.9 ms between any three ACPs. This allows 
the system to emulate replies from targets at a maximum range of around 
600km, taking the two-way challenge/reply trip time into account. 
Interrogations from the four FRUIT interrogators are combined with the 
interrogations from the interrogator being tested, and are thereafter routed to 
the TxP-TCC groups. FRUIT interrogators are similarly configured to the TxP-
TCe by the provision of a register to the DSP in order to allow it to 
enable/disable an interrogator, and to select the interrogation mode and PRF, 
as in Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3: Interrogator(x) Information Register (IIRx) bits allocation 
7 I 6 I 5 4 3 I 2 I 1 I 0 
Interrogation Mode: 
0000 : NlA 
Reserved Enable/Disable 0001 : Mode 1 
(110) 0010 : Mode 2 
0011: Mode3lA 
0100 : Secure Mode 4 
0101 : Mode C 
15 I 14 I 13 12 11 I 10 I 9 I 8 
PRI in steps of 1 Dns 
23 I 22 I 21 20 19 I 18 I 17 I 16 
PRI in steps of 1 Dns 
31 I 30 I 29 28 27 I 26 I 25 I 24 
PRI in steps of 1 Dns 
The system combined replies are made avai lable as an output to the 
interrogator being tested. 
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Figure 4.4 : SSRlIFF target emulator FPGA design. The shaded EMIF-A and User Constraints File (UCF) blocks were developed by the 
card manufacturer, Innovative Integration (8) , and used with slight modification in the design. The balance of the blocks, including the 
C6416 asp SW, were designed and implemented by the author. The toggling between the TxP-TCC groups happens at the occurrence 
of an ACP pulse. 
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4.5.1 TxP and TCC Design 
The sections below discuss the TxP-TCC design and interface. 
4.5.1.1 TxP-TCC Block Diagram 
In order to meet the re-configurability requirements of the TxP-TCC, the TxP-
TCC in Figure 4.5 is designed to be generic, which means that it is able to 
accept all input configuration parameters from asynchronous memory 
interfaced registers, namely: 
• The A, B, C, and D reply codes (recall Table 3.10) 
• The mode 4 decryption key (the usage of this key is illustrated in 
Figure 4.6) 
• Video input in respect of received interrogations from the interrogator 
being tested or from the FRUIT interrogators 
• Enable/Disable status for SIF/Mode 4 and SPI/Emergency replies 
• A delay value input corresponding to the range of the emulated target 
carrying the TxP-TCC pair 
• Clock and reset ports for synchronization and initialization of the 
design 
The SIF or mode 4 reply, a mode 4 disparity (which indicates the failure of a 
mode 4 challenge decryption) and the TxP busy signal are made available as 
outputs. The disparity, probe and busy signals are unused during operation 
and are only for debugging purposes. 
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Figure 4.5 : TxP~TCC block diagram showing the inputs and outputs 
4.5.1.2 TxP·TCC Interrogation Detection and Reply Generation 
Process 
The algorithm followed for the detection of SIF or secure mode interrogations 
and to generate the replies is presented in Figure 4.6. Table 4.4 contains the 
bits definition of the dear-text secure mode 4 challenge selected by Ihe author 
as a basic encryption scheme, and a place holder for future custom 
cryplography enhancements. 
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Table 4.4: Plain-text M4 challenge definition 
7 I 6 I 5 I 4 3 I 2 I 1 1 0 
Verification Byte - OxSA 
15 I 14 I 13 I 12 11 I 10 I 9 I 8 
Reserved 
23 I 22 I 21 I 20 19 I 18 I 17 I 16 
Reserved 
31 I 30 I 29 I 28 27 I 26 I 25 .1 24 
Secure Reply Position (M4 Reply Reserved 
Delay) 
The TCC makes use of the DSP configurable mode 4 key shown in Table 4.7 
in order to decrypt the received challenge, to verify the existence of the 
verification value, and then to extract the reply position from the last four bits 
of the decrypted challenge (recall the concept summary in Section 3.5.1.1). 
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Figure 4.6 : TxP and Tee interrogation detection and reply process. The TxP-Tee 
pair is to be implemented in VHDL on the Virtex ll FPGA. P2 and P5 tests are for 
sidelobe suppression for SIF and secure mode respectively. The cryptography 
operation shown in the Tee, which is an exclusive or (XOR) of a key with the 
received challenge to extract the clear-text challenge, is specific to the SSRlIFF 
target emulator and it was chosen for demonstration only. It can be considered as a 
place holder for future cryptography development. 
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4.5.1 .3 TxP~TCC Register Interface Bits Allocation 
For each TxP, the sets of registers defined in Table 4.5, Table 4 .6 and Table 
4.7 are created and programmed by the DSP at every ACP interrupt. The 
TxP(x) Information Register (TIR) is used to set the TxP personality i.e. SIF 
reply codes, and SIF/mode 4 enable/disable status, etc. 
Table 4 .5: TxP(x) Information Register (TIR) bits allocation. (1 = enable) 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
Reserved Emergency SPI M4Ena SIFEna 
15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 
A2 A1 AO B2 B1 BO Reserved 
23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 
C2 .C1 CO 02 01 DO Reserved 
31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24 
Reserved 
The TxP(x) Delay Register (TDR) contains the delay value according to which 
the TxP must delay its reply which is set by the DSP, depending on the 
emulated target range. 
Table 4.6: TxP(x) Delay Register (TDR) bits allocation 
31 o 
32 bit representing a delay value for the reply in steps of 10n5 
If the TxP receives a mode 4 interrogation, the decryption process described 
in Figure 4.6 uses the key in the TCC(x) Key Register (TKR) for the decryption 
process. 
Table 4.7: TCC(x) Key Register (TKR) bits allocation 
31 o 
32 bit TCe mode 4 challenge decryption key 
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4.6 SSRlIFF Target emulator DSP Detailed Design 
The emulated target identity and mobility management and continuous 
operation requirements are handled by the DSP (recall Figure 3.1). The 
following sections will expand on major DSP SW design issues. 
4.6.1 DSP-FPGA Asynchronous Memory Interface 
Figure 4.1 shows that the HW implementation allows the EMIF-A of the DSP to 
access the Virtexll FPGA. The EMIF-A controller configuration values have 
been taken from the board user manual [14] , and have been verified using the 
DSP memory map tables in the DSP data sheet (15). 
The registers used by the DSP to interface with the FPGA are presented in 
Table 4.8 along with their usage descriptions. All the registers are proprietary 
to the SSRlIFF target emulator, and their usage is part of the system design 
presented in this chapter. The registers fall within the EMIF-A chip-select 0 
range of the DSP and their names are used in the SW without being modified 
for traceability purposes. 
Table 4 .8 : FPGA registers and their addresses. All FPGA registers are 32 bits wide 
and the majority are in RNV mode, thus allowing better insight when debugging from 
the DSP side. 
Hex Address Decimal Register Type Description 
offset Name 
Address in 
FPGA 
QxBOOOOOOO 0 IPRCLR rlw Interrupt Pending Clear Register 
stores acknowiedgments from 
the DSP to the corresponding 
interrupts In the Interrupt 
Pending Register (IPR) 
OxBOO2()()()() 2 IPR r Interrupt Pending Register 
stores all the FPGA interrupts 
Ox80040000 4 IMR rlw Interrupt Masking Register 
values Indicates which FPGA 
interrupts should be enabled 
0,80060000 6 IIRO rlw Interrogator(O) Information 
Register 
OxBOO80000 8 ICRO rlw Interrogator(O) Challenge 
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Hex Address Decimal Register Type Description 
offset Name 
Address in 
FPGA 
Register 
Ox800AOOOO 10 TIRO rlw TxP(O) Information Register 
Ox800COOOO 12 TDRO rlw TxP(O) Delay Register 
Ox800EOOOO 14 TKRO rlw TCqO) Key Register 
OxB010OQOO 16 Reserved 
Ox8012oooo 18 TIR1 r/w TxP(1) Information Register 
OxB0140000 20 TDR1 r/w TxP(1) Delay Register 
OxB0160000 22 TKR1 rlw TCC(1) Key Register 
OxB0180000 24 ACPC R Antenna ACP Count Register 
Ox801AOOOO 26 Reserved 
Ox801COOOO 28 IIR1 rlw Interrogator(1) Information 
Register 
Ox801EOOOO 30 ICR1 rlw Interrogator(1) Challenge 
Register 
OxB0200000 32 IIR2 r/w Interrogator(2) Information 
Register 
OxB0220000 34 ICR2 rlw Interrogator(2) Challenge 
Register 
OxB0240000 36 Reserved 
Ox8026oooo 38 VERSION r FPGA code version number 
OxB0280000 40 TR1 rlw Test Register 1 used for testing 
Ox802AOOOO 42 TR2 r Test Register 2 is the inverse of 
TR1 
Ox802COOOO 44 Reserved 
Ox802EOOOO 46 lIR3 rlw Interrogator(3) Information 
Register 
Ox80300000 48 ICR3 rlw Interrogator(3) Challenge 
Register 
Ox8032oo00 50 TIR2 rlw TxP(2) Infonnation Register 
OxB0340000 52 TDR2 rlw TxP(2) Delay Register 
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Hex Address Decimal Register Type Description 
offset Name 
Address in 
FPGA 
OxB0360000 54 TKR2 rlw TCC(2) Key Register 
QxB0380000 56 Reserved 
Ox603AOOOO 58 TIR3 r/w TxP(3) Information Register 
Ox603COOOO 60 TDR3 r/w TxP(3) Delay Register 
Ox603EOOOO 62 TKR3 r/w TCC(3) Key Register 
4.6.2 Lookup Table and Targets Configuration information 
The OSP maintains two mirrored look-up tables and uses them in ping-pong 
style (as illustrated in Figure 4.7). One table is used to configure the TxP-TCC 
pairs in the FPGA at each ACP interrupt while the other table is being updated 
to prepare for the next antenna rotation, which is indicated by an ARP 
interrupt. 
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Figure 4.7 : Target information look-up tables ping-pong usage illustration 
The look-up table structure is defined in Table 4.9 below. 
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Table 4.9 : Target configuration look-up table format. For each ACP index, 
configuration parameters for four TxP-TCC pairs can be maintained, allowing the 
emulation of 4096·4 = 16384 targets per antenna rotation , thus exceeding the 1500 
targets system required. The ronflguration parameters are valid for one antenna 
rotation , i.e. 360°, 
ACP Count Targels TxP·TCC Pair Configuration Parameters 
0 TxP-TCCO TxP-TCC1 TxP-TCC2 TxP-TCC3 
Parameter Size ... ... . .. 
SIF EnablelDisable 32bits ... ... . .. 
Mode 4 Enable/Disable 
Mode 4 Decryption Key 
SPI Enable/Disable 
Emergency 
Enable/Disable 
A Code 
BCode 
CCode 
D Code 
Reply Delay 
1 TxP-TCCO TxP-TCC1 TxP-TCC2 TxP-TCC3 
... . .. 
... ... 
4095 ... 
Targets created in the code have configuration parameters as summarised in 
Table4.10. 
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Table 4.10 : Target information structure format. For each target created, the 
information in the table has to be provided once, and thereafter the procedures used 
to update the look-up tables maintain the target's mobility and use the target 
information in the updating process. 
Target(x) 
ACP Range Start 
ACP Range End 
ACP Change Rate 
A Code 
BCode 
Ceode 
o Code 
Mode 4 Decryption Key 
Reply Delay 
Delay Change Sign (target opening or dosing from the interrogator) 
Delay Change Value (how fast is the target opening or closing rrom the interrogator) 
Emergency Enable/Disable 
Mode 4 EnablelDisable 
SIF EnablelDisable 
SPI Enable/Disable 
4.6.3 DSP SW Design 
SW running on the TI TMS320C6416 DSP interacts with the FPGA by 
responding to ACP/ARP interrupts where the DSP re-configures the TxP-TCC 
pair's personalities for each ACP interrupt. The OSP maintains two mirrored 
look-up tables existing in SORAM, which contain the configuration parameters 
of the targets. The DSP is also responsible for configuring the FRUIT 
interrogators. 
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Figure 4.8 : Detailed design of the TI TMS320C6416 OS? SW. The DS? is responsible for maintaining target information, interacting 
with the FPGA and ensuring continuous operation. The application maintains two look-up tables: the one is used to update the Tx?-
TCe pairs on the FPGA, based on ACP interrupts from the FPGA while the other table is being updated with target behaviour for the 
subsequent antenna rotation . The switch between the tables is triggered by an ARP interrupt. The updating of the TxP-TCC pairs 
occurs in the Interrupt Service Routine (ISR).The DSP has more than enough time to update a table because the antenna rotation 
period for the system is 8 seconds. The interrupt vectors table and the memory command file are essential to the asp project and are 
thus part of the implementation discussed in Chapter 5. 
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4.7 Additional System Design Considerations and Notes 
The design of the interrupt mechanism between the DSP and FPGA can be 
expanded to allow it to accept up to 32 different interrupt types. This is 
handled by the interrupt controller block in the FPGA and the interrupt mask, 
pending and clear registers. 
There is no need for individual TxP-TCC interrupts (triggered by receiving 
individual interrogations) to be connected to the DSP, as this may result in 
bursts of interrupts that may require special attention in order to ensure that 
the system maintains its real-time performance. Instead, the system design 
has bypassed this problem by allowing interrupts to occur only in response to 
ACP/ARP pulses, and the statuses of all TxP-TCC pairs to be updated 
thereafter by the DSP at each ACP interrupt, regardless of the fact that the 
TxP-TCC pairs may have not received interrogations in that ACP. If a target 
does not exist during a specific ACP, the DSP disables it from replying by 
disabling the corresponding bit in the appropriate register. 
The data transferred at each ACP interrupt (which refers to the personality 
configuration registers of the TxP-TCC pairs) is relatively low, being around 
120 bytes. A simple asynchronous memory interface between the DSP and 
the FPGA has thus been chosen instead of a high data rate synchronous 
interface (which requires FIFOs and FIFO status monitoring logic in order to 
safely operate). 
The 100 MHz clock provided to the FPGA from the DSP is suitable for the 
design (as discussed in Section 4.4.1), which eliminates the need for the use 
of the on-board PLL. Using a higher frequency clock would have had 
unnecessary FIFO memory resource implications when sampling and storing 
replies from the TxP-TCC pairs. 
The use of FIFOs in the design to store and delay replies from targets is more 
economical than passing the replies to shift registers, due to the fact that the 
replies may be delayed for periods of up to around 4 ms (with a length of over 
20 IJs for a mode 1 emergency reply), and the FPGA does not have enough 
flip-flops to implement such shift register delays. 
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The design is sufficiently robust to accept non-uniform ACP pulse trains, 
which may occur due to the antenna being installed in a windy environment. 
The design will however not attempt to simulate such environmental effects. 
4.8 Summary 
This chapter has explained the detailed system design of the FPGA and DSP. 
Register interfaces and SW structures defined in this chapter will be used as a 
guideline for the system implementation, which will be covered in the following 
chapter. 
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5. Chapter 5: System Implementation 
This chapter aims to cover the implementation of the FPGA and DSP of the 
SSRlIFF emulator. The use of FPGA rapid prototyping tools, VHDL co-
simulation, DSP SW implementation methodology, as well as portability 
concerns will also be covered. DSP and FPGA resource utilization and spare 
capacity figures are presented. Finally, the observed system limitations of the 
SSRlIFF target emulator will be discussed. 
5.1 FPGA Design Implementation 
The subsections below discuss the implementation of the FPGA used in the 
SSR/IFF emulator. 
5.1.1 FPGA Implementation Tool-Chain 
VHDL co-simulation with Modelsim [10] has been used in the Matlab/Simulink 
environment, for the implementation and debugging of the FPGA design. 
Figure 5.1 presents the implementation workflow. Since co-simulation is 
adequate for rapid prototyping and VHDL debugging of a non DSP intensive 
application, the use of HW in-the-Ioop debugging techniques and Xilinx 
System Generator was unnecessary for the implementation of the emulator. 
VHDL has been chosen, because the Quixote sample projects supplied are 
written in VHDL, and because there is more support for VHDL in South Africa 
than for Verilog. ChipScope from Xilinx has been used to conduct the real-
time debugging of the FPGA-DSP asynchronous memory interface because 
of the relative difficulties that may arise when attempting to simulate the 
DSP's memory access to the FPGA using VHDL. Xilinx ISE version10.1 has 
been used for VHDL synthesis, translation, mapping, placing and routing, for 
generating the programme file, as well as for managing the JTAG 
configuration of the FPGA. 
85 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
r 
BIlL OlE 
Slmulate 
HDL 
Modules 
System Slmulatlon 
MATlAlllSlmulWl 
Figure 5.1 : From [9] . Simulink VHDL co-simulation, HW in-the-loop and real-time 
debugging. VHDL co-simulation allows the use of MATLAB code or Simulink models 
as a test bench, which generates stimulus for a VHDL simulation. It additionally 
allows multiple VHDL components to be replaced with MATLAB code or Simulink 
models, thus enabling the complete system to be simulated before all the VHDL 
design elements are available [9} [11] . 
5.1.2 Matlab/Simulink FPGA Implementation, Co-Simulation and 
Rapid Prototyping 
The emulated TxP was initially implemented in Simulink by using low level 
components such as counters and S-R flip-flops. This approach was however 
complex and time-consuming because the results thereof do not map directly 
to the desired state-machine VHDL implementation style. Figure 5.2 presents 
the Simulink implementation of a pulse width discriminator block in the TxP I 
for example. 
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Figure 5.2 : Simulink implementation of a pulse width discriminator. 
Matlab M-Files, C blocks and event-triggered Simulink blocks were later used 
instead of low level components, which made it simpler to write VHOL to 
describe the design. Simulink blocks were subsequently replaced with VHDL 
blocks one after the other. The model's functionality can be continuously 
verified as each block is replaced. thus allowing for rapid prototyping and 
debugging of the VHDL. 
Once all the Simulink blocks are replaced with VHDL, the Simulink blocks are 
used to provide a test bench for the VHDL. Writing VHDL test benches is 
often more time consuming and complex than writing the code being tested. 
Using Simulink blocks to co-simulate VHDL has proved to be extremely useful 
for verifying the timing requirements, and it can be effectively used when 
testing. as will be discussed in Chapter 6. Figure 5.3 is an example of 
Simulink blocks being replaced with VHDL blocks, thus allowing for rapid 
prototyping of the TxP subsystem. 
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Figure 5.3 : Simulink blocks are replaced with VHDL blocks (labe lled ModelSim) one 
after the other. It ;s often useful to retain the replaced Simulink blocks in order to 
compare their outputs with the VHDL outputs. The top right block labelled "mode 
detect" is written in C using the Simulink "S-function Builder", which is an example of 
mixed language co-simulation. 
5.1.3 VHDL Code Portability 
The implemenled VHDL code is chip independent and generic, except for the 
FIFO FPGA components thereof. Should it be necessary to port the code to 
another FPGA manufacturer, the FIFO component declaration and port map 
will only require minor modification in order to comply with a different 
manufacturer's library calls for using on-chip FIFOs. 
5.2 DSP SW Implementation 
The sections below discuss the asp SW implementation . 
5.2.1 SW Implementation Methodology 
TI CCS version 3.3 allows the DSP to be programmed by means of C or C++. 
The SW has been written in C because of its relative simplicity and to allow 
for future compliance with the C coding standards of the Motor Industry 
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Software Reliability Association (MISRA) [18]. The IDE from TI (CCS) was 
supplied along with the Quixote board, and this was used for SW editing, 
compilation, linking and JTAG programming/debugging. 
5.2.2 SW Portability 
The DSP SW has been designed and implemented without the use of the 
DSP BIOS [19] Operating System (OS) to allow for possible future MISRA 
compliance and portability to a different processor. Furthermore, the C and H 
files that comprise the SW were partitioned into physical and application layer 
files. Physical layer files contain code to access any low level chip specific 
registers, whereas application layer files contain target information and 
information on look-up table maintainability (which does not involve interaction 
with any DSP peripherals). This partitioning allows the SW to be ported to any 
chip by a different manufacturer without any modification being made to the 
application layer files. 
5.2.3 DSP Interrupt Vector Table and Memory Command File 
Creation 
In order to develop the SW for the DSP in CCS, an interrupt vector assembly 
file and a memory command file must be part of the SW project. The interrupt 
vector file serves the linker because it contains the C function names of 
interrupt service routines to which the program counter should jump to if an 
enabled interrupt occurs. The memory command file contains instructions in 
respect of program sections and stack placement in the various internal or 
external memories available to the DSP. Memory range values were provided 
from the Quixote manuals [9]. 
5.3 FPGA and DSP Source Code 
The source codes for the FPGA and DSP are on a CD accompanying this 
thesis. The CD directory structure is presented in Appendix B. 
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5.4 FPGA and DSP Resource Utilization 
The figures below present the FPGA and DSP resource ulilization of the 
current implementation. These figures are necessary to assess the possibility 
of porting the design to a different board or using different processors. 
Device Utilillilioll SUlllIIIIlI}t CJ 
logic Utiliultioft U.ed AVlllilllbl. Utillrolion NOleel) 
Totlill Nu .. tMl S lice Regi"II'1 
"" 
61.se~ 
'" NumbeI wed 61 Flop Flop. 
'''' Numb,. und M Lalch •• ~ 
N!.mbe. gt 4 ""P"I wrl 1.140 61.584 
'" Logic Dillributioll 
Numbe< 01 0CQ.IpIed Slice. U'5 )),792 , .. 
NImbef 01 Skft ~ oNy rNIed logic 6.615 UIS 
"'"' N..mI:leI 01 SIic" conIIIIIwIg WlI1IieIad bQoc 0 U15 
'" TOlol NI",n, of 4 input LUT. 9.774 61.584 "X 
IVnber IOMd ... 1.'" 
IVnber \IMd as II J'OIM-fIN U~ 
NurrItMr lINd as SI'OIII r'\IItle<5 ,~ 
No:mbe< 01 boftcIed !!JIll 
---
55. . .. "X ~ 
108 Flip F'Iopt • 
""'--""'--NII'nbe< (It RAMS1 it " ,~ "X Numbe< oIMlA.n8X18. • ,~ 
" Numbt.oI BUFGMLO<a • 
" 
"X 
Nl.mber 01 oet.h , 
" 
"X __OSCAN. 
, 
"., 
No.mber 01 RPt.I rneaol 
" 
Figure 5.4 : FPGA resource utilization summary produced by Xilinx ISE version 10.1. 
The reply delay methodology used in the emulator design relies on on-chip memory 
(FIFOs). Only 10% of the available RAM16s of the FPGA is used for the emulation 
of 4000 targets. Additionally, only 8% of the available flip-flops is used, which may 
motivate the porting of the design to a smaller FPGA. 
90 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
.... , ....... , .. , •................•.••.•.•.••••••••••.• ...... .............•.••. 
TMS32OC6x COFF Unker PC v6.0.8 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
»linktd Mon May 17 16:32:02 2010 
OUTPUT FILE NAME: <./Debug/Quixote_DSP.out> 
ENTRY POINT SYMBOL: '_cJntOO" address: 00035460 
MEMORY CONFIGURATION 
name or igin length used unused 
------
VECTOR OOOOOOOO 00000200 00000200 00000000 
ON-CHIP 00001200 OOOaeeOO 000344010 ooo7i196O 
CAOIE_12 OOOCOOOO 00040000 OOOOOOOO 00040000 
Ext_SORAM 010000000 02000000 oo14Oll0 OlebfefO 
utilization 
_._-1_ 
'"" 
"" 
'" 
Figure 5.5 : OSP internal and extemal memory utitization summary produced by CCS 
version 3.3. The target look-up tables are defined in the code to reside on the 
external SORAM. Only 3% of the SDRAM is used and 30% of the on-chip RAM, 
which mainly contains the program text. 
5.5 Additional Implementation Considerations 
In order for the project to compile using Xilinx ISE version 10.1, the FPGA 
UCF file supplied along with the Quixote board (which lists the constraints in 
respect of pin allocation, timing, area, etc.) needed to be modified. This 
involved removing all the references to any unused signals or components in 
the fil e. However, this was not a problem in ISE version 9.0. 
In order to reduce the board's power consumption and heat dissipation, as 
well as to avoid abnormal behaviour of chips connected to the FPGA that 
were not used in the design, unused pins have either been connected to 
ground or tri·stated in the FPGA. 
5.6 System Limitations 
The following list summarises the observed system limitations: 
1. The implemented TTL solution does not allow for amplitude variations 
of reply pulses based on target range. 
2. Recalling the ping·pong architecture in the FPGA presented in Section 
4.5 and depicted in Figure 4.3, if the system interfaces with an antenna 
91 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
with a faster rotation period, the system maximum simulated range will 
decrease (since the ACP spacing decreases as a consequence 
thereof). This is only a future risk, which will arise if the system is 
required to interface with a faster rotation period antenna. However, the 
implemented system is currently compliant with the 8s antenna rotation 
period specified by the user. 
3. The functionality of the ICC has been studied and requirements have 
been allocated thereto, although they were not implemented. This is 
because the ICC was deemed to be beyond the top level project scope 
depicted in Figure 1.1. The secure mode 4 FRUIT replies capability of 
the system was satisfied without the ICC, because the interrogator 
being tested is not exposed to the interrogations causing FRUIT, as it 
is only interested in the mode 4 FRUIT replies. Therefore fixed mode 4 
challenges are generated by the FRUIT interrogators. 
5.7 Summary 
This chapter has discussed the issues pertaining to the implementation of the 
FPGA and DSP, and presented the tools used to prototype and implement the 
design. The SW implementation methodology and portability has also been 
discussed. A discussion of the limitations of the SSRIIFF target emulator 
concludes the chapter. The next chapter aims to cover the verification and 
testing of system requirements. 
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6. Chapter 6: System Testing and Results 
This chapter will cover the requirements verification and testing of the 
SSRIIFF targets emulator. In this regard, tests were designed to verify 
selected key system requirements (as set out in Chapter 3), and test results 
will be presented herein. The user Qualification Test Results (QTR) document 
[17] captures the test results not presented in this thesis for space limitations. 
Two testing methods were utilised, i.e. Matlab/Simulink co-simulation and on-
target tests. Each testing method will be explained below. For each test, the 
requirements to be verified are stated, and settings required to perform the 
test are presented, followed by a summary discussing the results. 
6.1 System Demonstration and Testing Methodology 
At the time this chapter was written, the interrogator signal processor (recall 
Figure 4.2) and the SSRlIFF antenna were unavailable. An emulated 
interrogator on the FPGA will thus act as the interrogator being tested, and 
the system will generate the ACP/ARP pulses. The SSRlIFF target emulator 
will be demonstrated firstly by using co-simulation techniques and secondly by 
using an Intronix [16] logic analyser. The emulated interrogator being tested 
operates in the same manner as any of the FRUIT interrogators in the system. 
TTL signals from the Quixote digital 1/0 pins are connected via a cable to a 
50-pin breakout board, which allows the logic analyser to monitor the output 
signals. Figure 6.1 illustrates the test setup. 
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Figure 6.1 : SSRlIFF target emulator test setup. Two JTAG emulators are used for 
configuring the DSP and the FPGA on the Quixote board. TIL signals tolfrom the 
Quixote are routed to a breakout board for monitoring by the LogicPort Intronix logic 
analyser. 
Co-simulation by means of Matlab/Simulink and Modelsim will be used to test 
the FPGA related requirements, such as pulse width validation, etc. This is 
due to the somewhat limited timing measurement capabilities of the logic 
analyser. Modelsim is an excellent visualization tool that is capable of 
capturing simulation results for significantly longer periods than the logic 
analyser is able to; moreover, the timing cursors in Modelsim are easy to use 
for nanoseoond measurements. Using Matlab/simulink furthermore allows for 
more rapid testing, as test parameters such as pulse intervals, enable/disable 
SPI, etc can be visually edited by using a mouse pOinter instead of writing 
VHDL test benches, as illustrated in Figure 6.3. 
The limitation of the co-simulation setup is that it can only verify a single 
emulated target due to the absence of the role of the DSP in the simulation. In 
order to test multiple targets, the logic analyser is used to monitor real outputs 
from the system where the FPGA and DSP run in real-time. Figure 6.2 
presents the co-simulation test setup in the co-simulation environment. 
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[[][[][[] 
Figure 6.2 : Co-simulation TxP-TCC and FRUIT interrogator test environment. VHDL blocks are visually present in Simulink and it is 
fairly easy to change test parameters, such as interrogation pulse widths, interrogation modes, mode 4 keys, etc. The outpu t of the co-
simulation can be viewed with the Simul ink scope or in Modelsim, where advanced timing measurement facil ities are available. 
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Figure 6.3 : Example of co-simulation testing parameters. In Simulink it is easy to 
construct different cha llenge modes with different pulse widths and intervals as 
depicted in the top two subfigures and the bottom left subfigure. Inputs defined as 
standard-logic-vectors in VHDL (such as the reply delay that depends on the target 
range and the mode 4 secure key) can be changed to any desired value, using 
vectors in Simulink constant blocks as depicted in the bottom right subflgure. 
6.2 Co-simulation Tests 
The tests shown below are mainly timing related and are performed in the co-
simulation environment as presented in Figure 6.2. The TxP-Tee pair range 
(or the reply delay) is set to zero unless otherwise stated and the target SIF 
reply code bits is set to all ones for the entire test in the co-simulation 
environment. 
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6.2.1 SIF Mode Intervals 
Purpose: 
To verify that the TxP-TCC pair complies with Pl-P3 time interval 
requirements as stated in Section 3.4.2.1. 
Settings: 
• An undefined Pl-P3 SIF interval (not STANAG compliant) interrogation 
is sent to the TxP-TCC pair. 
• SIF modes enabled, SPI disabled and emergency disabled. 
Test Summary: 
The TxP-TCC pair does not reply to an interrogation with an undefined Pl-P3 
interval. This is expected, as the TxP-TCC will only reply if the P1-P3 interval 
is defined. 
Figure 6.4 : TxP-Tee pair does not reply to an undefined SIF interrogation. 
6.2.2 SIF Mode Intervals Tolerance 
Purpose: To verify that the TxP-TCC pair complies with the following : 
• The P1-P3 time interval tolerance requirements as stated in Section 
3.4.2.1. 
• TxP fixed processing time delay of 3.0 J.1s with a tolerance of ± 0.5 ).1.5 
from the rising edge of interrogation pulse P3 to the rising edge of the 
reply pulse Fl . (This requirement is stated in Section 3.4 .2.11). 
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Settings: 
• A valid timing mode 2 interrogation is sent to the TxP-TCC pair with a 
negative tolerance of 0.1 ~s . 
• SIF modes enabled, SPI disabled, emergency disabled. 
Test Summary: 
As expected, the TxP-TCC pair can detect and reply to a mode 2 interrogation 
with a negative tolerance of 0.1 ~s. The TxP complies with the 3.0 ~s ± 0.5 ~s 
tolerance processing time delay requirement where a reply was produced 
after 3.079 ~s . 
Figure 6 .5 : TxP-TCC pair replies to a mode 2 interrogation with a negative tolerance 
of 0.1 J..LS with a 3 Jls processing time delay. 
Figure 6.6 : A reply group pulse width is 0.450 JlS as expected for a SIF reply. 
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6.2.3 SIF Mode Interrogation Pulse Width Validation 
Purpose: 
To verify that the TxP-TCC pair is able to validate received interrogation pulse 
widths in order to comply with the requirement as stated in Section 3.4.2.2. 
Settings: 
• A mode 1 interrogation is sent to the TxP-TCe pair containing a narrow 
P1 pulse. 
• SIF modes enabled, SPI disabled, emergency disabled. 
Test Summary: 
As expected, the TxP-TCe pair does not reply to an interrogation with a pulse 
width outside of a 0.8 ± 0.1 ~s window period. 
Figure 6.7 : Txp-TCC pair does not reply to a mode 2 interrogation with a narrow P1 
pulse. 
6.2.4 SIF Mode SPl/Emergency Replies 
Purpose: 
To verify the TxP-TCC pair is capable of generating SPI and emergency 
replies when required to do so as set out in Section 3.4.2.9. 
Settings: 
• A mode 1 interrogation is sent to the TxP-TCC pair. 
• SIF modes enabled. 
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• SPI enabled, emergency disabled. 
• Repeat for SPI disabled, emergency enabled. 
Test Summary: 
As expected. the TxP-TCC pair is capable of generating SPI and emergency 
replies. 
Figure 6.8 : TxP-TCC pair generating an SPI reply that comprises two reply groups 
for mode 1. The 20.3 IlS duration requirement from F1-F2 for each group is also 
satisfied. 
Figure 6.9 : TxP· Tee pair generating an emergency reply that comprises a reply 
group and three sets of framing F1-F2 pulses for mode 1. 
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6.2.5 Mode 4 Processing 
Purpose: 
• To verify that the TxP·TCC repties in the correct repty position when 
successfully decrypting a mode 4 challenge, as required in terms of 
Sections 3.4.2.12 and 3.5.2.4. 
• To verify that the TxP·TCC performs All pulse validation and that it 
validates the widths and spacing of all received challenge pulses, as 
required in terms of Section 3.4.2.3. 
Sellings: 
• A mode 4 challenge is sent to the TxP· TCC with the last reply position 
encrypted in the challenge, i.e. 202 .... 5 + 60 IlS as explained in Figure 
3.6. 
• A mode 4 challenge is sent to the TxP· TCC where pulses P5 and DO 
are not present and All pulse 1 is missing , which creates an All rule 
violation. 
• Mode 4 enabled, SIF modes disabled and M4 key bits set to zeros. 
Test Summary: 
The TxP·TCC reply occurs in tine correct reply position , as the delay between 
P4 and the first reply pulse is measured to be 262.03 ~s. 
Figure 6.10 : TxP-TCC replying in the last reply position 
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Figure 6.1 1 : TxP-TCC does not reply to a challenge missing the first All pulse. 
6.2.6 TxP·TCC SIFIMode 4 Internal Suppression and Performance 
Purpose: 
• To verify that, after the delection of a valid interrogation, the TxP·TCC 
ignores incoming interrogations until a reply has been generated for the 
detected interrogation. The TxP· TCC should be able to detect and 
reply to incoming interrogations within 10 )J.s of the completion of the 
SIF reply and 290 ~s after a mode 4 reply is completed. These 
requirements are stated in Section 3.4.2.7 
• To verify the requirements for Ihe TxP·TCC SIF and mode 4 reply rates 
as lisled in Sections 3.4.2.13 and 3.5.2.1. This wi ll be done by analysis. 
Settings: 
• Three mode 1 interrogations are sent to the T xP-TCC with an interval 
of 15 ~s between them. 
• Enable SIF modes. 
• Repeat while enabling mode 4 and disabling SIF modes. The time 
interval is 150 ~s between the first and second challenges, and 125 ~s 
between the second and the third challenges. 
Test Summary: 
As expected, the TxP-TCC ignores received interrogations when a reply to a 
previous interrogation has not yet been generated . The TxP-TCC becomes 
ready to receive new interrogations even before the 10 )J.s S IF and 290 )J.s 
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secure mode readiness allowance times. This therefore proves that the TxP-
TCC can easily comply with the requirements for processing 1200 and 3000 
challenges per second, for SIF modes and mode 4 respectively. 
Figure 6.12 : Three mode 1 interrogations injeded to the TxP-TCC. The second 
interrogation is ignored and the TxP-TCC was ready to reply to the third interrogation, 
which occurred around 3.5 Ils after the end of the reply generated for the first 
interrogation. 
Figure 6.13 : Three mode 4 interrogations injeded to the TxP-TCC. The second 
interrogation is ignored and the TxP-TCC was ready to reply to the third interrogation, 
which occurred around 2.9 JlS after the end of the reply generated for the first 
interrogation. 
6.3 Real~Time on~Target Tests 
The tests in the following subsections are performed on the target HW. The 
figures captured in these tests consist of screen shots from a logic analyser, 
whereby twelve lines are combined to represent the simulated antenna ACP 
count, which is then presented in decimal numbers. 
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6.3.1 Target Creation and Programmability Tests 
Purpose: 
To verify the following: 
• That the system complies with the target creation and configuration 
requirements listed in Section 3.9.1 .1. 
• The requirements for the generation of ACP/ARP pulses (antenna 
simulation) and the system's ability to set the ACP ranges of targets, as 
listed under the target mobility manager, discussed in Section 3.10.2.1. 
Settings: 
• Create two test targets using the code settings in Figure 6.14. 
• Enable two interrogators in modes 2 and 4 . 
• t:rHt. fir. d-.olllrnJurut t<U'Y*! ~l_ IICP 10 tJIId 60. 
fJYJIl$ I II tI CIIrrJ_ ",JU .. /X>6Sf llln Td~ of JO(u)( V ' 
I"e5e tT.,.,.t.St.l'ItCt (&targat I ) ; 
h,.,at1.AC"-toM. • to : 
torgaU.ACPalld • 60 ; 
torgaU.ACPch<'lIl1aRata · 2 ; 
Ur,aU.AJWs . 0%1 ; 
t4l"3'.t1.8R~ - Osl ; 
ta"Sal1.CRo, - 01:7 ; 
to,.,ot l.d.cryptJ.ay • (\1000('(10,0\5 • 
• I ( J.J.AI . ... lIl6. j • • ' '1Ft, ... y trip ) ~ .11;. - S 1 .• ( IOat. FftU d(X~J - 5 "Jo><:i. I_k • 
to,.,atl.dalayV .. !ua • '6<100 : 
t0I'3nl.daloyChUS.Slgo - NEGATIVE; 
ursnl.delayC'haaSeVol ~e • 0 : 
tarset I.OReS .. Ox~ : 
Ursnl.£Mrseney • 0.0 : 
terset l . 104 4EDe . 0xQ ; 
tergn1.S lfEu • 0::.1 . 
torsetl.SP I .. ~O : 
.. ~u. ~d .i-':>hStrlJtJ (}1I t"IY'.r /NI t_" lIel' .'000 (}l1d . '(VO. 
F'Y11l9 r.-.-N6 tnll rtultlr tit <f 6,.....t ¢IE .·O~ ". <flla .. t "II UIJ!J'" n11t9" dE . 'Ot1J()( 
~tTu'!Jet.St.nIct ('urset2) : 
tal'!Jet2.ACPlton • 2000 ; 
tal'!Jet2.ACPend • 2020 ; 
tal'!Jet2.ACPc: llonseRote .. 0 ; 
torset2.AAeS .. Oxl ; 
torset2.8Reg .. OxO ; 
torget2.CReg .. OxO : 
torset2 .d.crypt~y .. OxOOOOO0A5 ; 
torset2.deleyVolue .. 1332995 ; 
torget2.de l ey('boligeSlgli .. NEGATIVE; 
torset2.delay('bangeVo l qe .. 10000 : lOu. E.1T I' :00. ... tttry,.t 
torset2.0Res .. OxO ; 
torget2.Eaerseney .. ~O ; 
torset2.M4[ na .. Ox l ; 
tarset2.S I fEna .. OxO ; 
tarset2 .SPI .. OxO : 
Figure 6.14 : The code snippet presented is used to create two test targets. The 
system is flexible enough to create more complicated scenarios, such as, for 
example, crossing targets or enabling up to 4000 ta rgets. 
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Test Summary: 
As seen in the figures below, targets are successfully created and are 
configurable in identity, mode 4 key, range, velocity and azimuth. The created 
target ranges and azimuths are updated by the system if required (stationary 
targets can also be created). 
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-"""1."-
./' 
./' 
_A·" 1~"" 
./' 
J 
DI_nllDoo 0I1...-1..c . 0'_1000 
D)"-I1l1Doo DII l_I<oC: . 01_'" 
Figure 6.15 : The mode enabled target between ACPs 2000 and 2020 is flying towards the interrogator with a constant velocity of 
200m/s. After each antenna rotation, the reply delay corresponding to the target range is 101-15 less as measured by using logic analyser 
cursors . A delay of 15951-15 is equal to the two-way interrogation/reply trip time for a target at 200km, plus the 2021-15 TxP-TCC 
processing time and the 601-15 mode 4 last position reply delay, 
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.... 
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Figure 6.16 : The first target is between ACPs 10 and 60 (from Figure 6.14) with an azimuth change rate of 2 ACPs per antenna 
rotation. Replies from the target are present for interrogation occurring up to ACP 60 for the first antenna rotation and up to 62 for the 
second and so on. The upper part of the figure is a magnified view of a reply . Note that the target is only enabled for SlF modes, and 
that it does not reply to the mode 4 interrogations. 
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6.3.2 FRUIT Interrogators Test 
Purpose: 
The verification of the requirements for multiple interrogators listed in Sections 
3.6.3.1 and 3.7.2.1. 
Settings : 
• From the DSP, enable FRUIT interrogator a for mode 1 with a PRI of 
4ms, which is done by writing to the liRa. 
• From the DSP, enable FRUIT interrogator 1 for mode 4 wi th a PRI of 
2ms, which is done by writing to the IIR1 (recall Table 4.8). 
• Create an example target to demonstrate a FRUIT reply. 
• Reconfigure the interrogators for interrogation in modes 1 and C. 
Test Summary: 
As expected, the system complies with the multiple interrogators requirement. 
The system is thus capable of generating FRUIT replies. FRUIT interrogators 
are configurable for interrogation modes and in PRI in numerous FRUIT 
scenarios. 
Figure 6.17 : Interrogations from two different interrogators are shown in different 
interrogation modes and PRls. Interrogations are not synchronous to ACPs in any 
way. The lower part of the image is a magnified view of ACP 3. 
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Figure 6 .18 : FRUIT reply scenario. During ACP 17, the first reply is intended for the 
mode C interrogation generated during ACP 16, and it will thus be considered as a 
FRUiT reply to the interrogator interrogating in mode 1. The second reply comes 
from the same target and is in response to the mode 1 interrogation. The lower part 
of the figure is zoomed out. 
6.3.3 Garbled Replies Test 
Purpose: 
To verify the requirement for garbled replies as stated in Section 3.6.3.2. The 
test will also present the system's ability to create target mobility scenarios. 
Settings: 
The scenario in Figure 6.19 uses the following settings: 
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1. Create a first target at a range of 177km, flying in a circle with an 
azimuth starting at ACP 927 to 992 and an azimuth change rate of 2 
ACPs per antenna rotation. 
2. Create a second target at a range of 200km, flying towards the 
interrogator with a velocity of 200mls and at an azimuth starting at ACP 
1000 to 1020. 
0" I ARP I AePO 
A(PlOOO 
Figure 6.19 : Targets crossing scenario. When the targets are at the same range or 
at a close range, their replies overlap. 
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resetTorgetStruc t (&t.orset I) : 
torset I .A(:Petort ~ 927 : 
targetl.ACPend - 9'12 ; 
tarset I .ACPcbal1seRate • • 
tarset I.ARes _ 01:7 : 
torset I .8ROS - Ox7 ; 
torget I .CROS ~ Ox ; 
torsetl.decryptKey _ OxOOOOO0A5 ; 
tarsetl.delayVallle ~ 118666 : 
tOl"'get I . deloyCbollSeSIStl - NEGAT IVE; 
torget I .delayCbonseVo I \Ie ~ 0 : 
torset I . OReS ~ Ox7 ; 
target I .t-ersency - OxO : 
torsetl.1014Ena - OxO : 
targot I .SIFEno - Ox I : 
torsotl.SPJ _ OxO : 
~etTorsetSt.ruct (&torset2l ; 
target2 .ACPstort - 1000 ; 
targot2. ACPend - 1020 ; 
t o rset2.ACPc ho nseRo te - 0 ; 
tol'get2. ARes .. OxO ; 
torget2.8Re S - OxO ; 
tarsot2.CRes - OxO ; 
torget2.decryp tKey .. OxOOOOOOA5 ; 
torset2 . delayVo l ue - 133295 ; 
torset2.deloyCho nseSls n - NEGATI VE : 
tarset2 . delayChonseVolue - 1000 ; 
torset2.DRes .. OxO ; 
torset 2. EMergency 
torset2.1014Eno 
torget2.S IFEna 
targot2.SPI 
OxO ; 
OxO ; 
Oxl ; 
OxO ; 
Figure 6.20 : Gode snippet used to create test targets for the garbled replies test 
Test Summary: 
The screen shots as seen below depict the replies from targets before 
crossing each other, while at close range or at the same range, and after they 
have crossed each other. The sequence of events is broken down and 
presented in the figures below. As expected, the system is compliant with the 
requirement in respect of generating garbled replies. 
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Figure 6.21 : Replies from two targets with different reply codes are presented. As the targets come ctoser to each other in range, their 
replies overlap. The sequence of events is continued in the next figures. As the targets move away from each other, the garbling 
condition no longer exists. 
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Figure 6.25 : A magnified view of the garbling scenario. An interrogator with de· 
garbling and tracking facilities may be able to detect the targets from the garbled 
replies. 
6.3.4 Maximum number of targets test 
Purpose: 
To verify the requirement for the maximum number of targets as stated in 
Section 3.9.1.2. This test cannot be performed without an interrogator signal 
processor and thus will be performed by analysis. This is because of the logic 
analyser sample store memory limitations and because it is very difficult to try 
and identify 1500 targets manually. 
Settings: 
1. Using the code settings in Figure 6.14, repeat in a for-loop to enable all 
targets with random reply codes and random initial positions. 
2. Enable two interrogators in modes 2 and 4. 
Test Summary: 
The system has adequate memory and processing power to enable up to 
4000 targets as discussed in Chapter 4. The ping-pong techniques used allow 
8 seconds of processing time for the system to update target locations for the 
following antenna rotation which is considered sufficient time for the task. 
6.4 Summary 
This chapter has explained the methods used to test and verify the system. 
The purpose of each test and any required settings have been stated and 
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their results discussed. The next chapter will conclude the project and suggest 
areas for future improvements. 
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7. Chapter 7: Conclusions and Future Work 
This chapter covers the conclusions and recommendations of the SSRIIFF 
target emulator project, and proposes future areas of improvement. 
7.1 Project Summary and Conclusions 
The SSR/IFF emulator project began by capturing the user requirements in 
Chapter 2. These were further analysed and a system breakdown structure 
was drawn up from the analysis. Concept summaries for each subsystem in 
the system breakdown were then presented in order to facilitate requirements 
allocation for each of the subsystems. This resulted in a specification for the 
product being realized, which was examined in Chapter 3. A top-level and 
detailed design of the system, including tradeoffs and partitioning decisions 
between the FPGA and DSP, were then discussed in Chapter 4. 
Consequently, a description of the implementation methodology and the 
implantation tool-chain, followed by the limitations of the system was put 
forward in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 portrayed the testing and verification of the 
system against requirements, wherein test cases were designed and test 
results discussed. 
It was found that the SSR/IFF target emulator is compliant with the 
requirements presented in Chapter 3, apart from the system limitations listed 
under Section 5.6. The system is capable of generating replies in real-time 
from 4000 distinct identity mobile targets for SSRIIFF modes 1, 2, 3/A, C and 
4, situated at a distance from 0 to 600km. The system is additionally able to 
generate FRUIT replies and to interface with or emulate an SSRlIFF antenna. 
The system furthermore allows for the creation of target crossing scenarios for 
generating advanced garbled replies situations. The fully configurable target 
parameters allow for the emulation of different target types including 
stationary ones. 
7.2 Recommendations and Future Work 
Below is a list of recommendations for possible future improvements to the 
SSR/IFF target emulator: 
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1. In order to allow the system to interface with an antenna that has a 
higher rotation period than the one specified by the user (8s/rotation) or 
to emulate targets at ranges beyond 600km, a third set of TxP-TCC 
pairs can be added to the FPGA design. The ping-pong operation will 
have to be modified to create an operation involving three stages, 
which would allow a group of TxP-TCC pairs an amount of time to 
delay a reply equal to the time between four ACPs, as opposed to 
three in the current implementation. The DSP code will require no or 
only minor modification and the target information look-up tables will 
not be affected. Recall Figure 4.3 for the current implementation. 
2. Target creation in the current implementation is done manually or by 
using function calls. An automated solution may involve a PC 
application with a GUI that will allow graphical scenario creation. This 
application would be able to update the target look-up tables in the 
SDRAM via the DSP, since the DSP is already equipped with a PCI 
interface peripheral, which would make it available on the PCI bus, 
while also allowing for a possible interface point with the ITRC for data 
exchange with the target emulator. 
3. The resource utilization, as illustrated in Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5 in 
Chapter 5, shows that the processors and memories used have ample 
spare capacity. The Quixote board also contains ADCs, DACs and 
other analogue support components, which are not utilized by the 
target emulator in a TTL implementation. It is recommended that the 
design be ported to a less expensive board if the idea in the 
abovementioned point is not implemented. 
4. A more realistic interrogator operation environment could be provided 
by modifying the FRUIT interrogators in order to allow for a PRI 
random stagger. 
5. As a future improvement, the emulator may simulate the presence of 
reflective surfaces during user selected ACP ranges. This would 
simulate the effect of multiple target returns in order to create a real life 
scenario to which interrogators may be exposed. 
119 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
C
pe
 T
wn
120 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Bibliography 
[1] Stevens, M.C. (1988). Secondary Surveillance Radar. Artech House. 
[2] Military Agency for Standardization, North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO). (1990). Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 4193 PART 1 
edition 2 Annex A and appendices, Technical Characteristics of IFF Mk XA 
and Mk XII Interrogators and Transponders. 
[3] Kingsley. S. and Quegan, S. (1999). Understanding Radar Systems. 
SciTech Publishing. 
[4] United States Navy, Naval Air Systems Command and Naval Air Warfare 
Centre. (1999). Electronic Warfare and Radar Systems Engineering 
Handbook Rev 2. 
[5] Defence Systems Management College (DSMC) Fort Belvoir. 
(1983). Systems Engineering Management Guide. 
[6] Blanchard, B.S. and Fabrycky, W.J. (1990). Systems engineering and 
analysis. 2nd ed. Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 
[7] "Identification Friend or Foe" [Online] Available: 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/systems/iff.htm 
(Accessed in June 2010). 
[8] "Innovative Integration Quixote DSP Board Product Folder" [Online] 
Available: http://www.innovative-dsp.com/products.php?product=Quixote 
(Accessed in June 2010). 
[9] "Innovative Integration Frame Work Logic Product Folder" [Online] Available: 
http://www.innovative-dsp.com/products.php?product=FrameWork%20Logic 
(Accessed in June 2010). 
[10] Mentor Graphics Modelsim [Online] Available: http://model.com (Accessed 
in June 2010) 
[11] Mathworks matlab/simulink [Online] Available: 
http://www.mathworks.com/products/simulink/ (Accessed in June 2010). 
[12] IS031-5: Quantities and units: Electricity and Magnetism. International 
Organization for Standardization, (1992). 
[13] Virtexll platform FPGAs data sheet, XILlNX, (2007). 
[14] Innovative Integration. (2008). Quixote User's Manual Rev 2.0. 
[15] TMSC6416 DSP data sheet, TI, (2001). 
121 
Un
ive
sit
y o
f C
ap
e T
ow
n
[16] "INTRONIX, PC-Based Test and Measurement" [Online] Available: 
http://www.pctestinstruments.comllogicport/specifications.htm (Accessed in 
June 2010). 
[17] Qualification Test Results (QTR) number 3302-7642 V1.2. (May 2010). 
[18] "Motor Industry Software Reliability Association" [Online] Available: 
http://www.misra.org.ukl (Accessed in June 2010). 
[19] "DSP/BIOS Real-Time Kernel" [Online] Available: 
http://focus.tLcom/docs/toolsw/folders/printldspbios.html(Accessed in June 
2010). 
122 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Appendix A : User Requirements Traceability Matrix 
Table 7.1 : User Requirements Traceability Matrix 
User Description Derived Relevant Aspects 
ReqUlrement~1 ~~ .. Requirement 
Section(s) Section I~\ 
2.1.1 TxP and TCC 3.4.2 - TxPtiming 
requirements. 
-
TxP interface to 
TCC. 
-
TxP performance 
requirements. 
3.5.2 - TCC timing 
requirements. 
- TCC performance 
requirements. 
2.1.2 SSRlIFF Reply Modes 3.4.2 & 3.5.2 TxP SIF modes and 
mode 4. 
2.1.3 Number of Targets 3.9.1.2 Number of Targets 
3.10.2 Target distribution in a 
3600 space 
2.1.4 Distinct Target Identity 3.9.1 Target configuration 
parameters, which 
include reply codes. 
2.1.5 Friendly and Non-Friendly 3.9.1 Target configuration 
Targets parameters include a 
mode 4 key. 
2.1.6 Real-time Operation 3.12 Real-time requirement 
will be satisfied by 
implication when the 
other subsystems' 
requirements are 
satisfied. 
2.1.7 Continuous Operation 3.9.1 Target parameters are 
reconfigurable. 
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User Description Derived Relevant Aspects 
Requirement Requirement 
Section Section(s) 
3.11 .1 System will keep 
maintaining targets 
until user chooses to 
end the emulation. 
2.1.8 Target Mobility and Space 3.10.2 Target distribution in a 
360G space. 
3.9. 1 Target configuration 
parameters indude 
target range. 
3.9.1 Target configuration 
parameters indude 
mode C attitude code. 
2.1.9 Garbled and FRUIT Replies 3.6.3 Placement of 
interrogators in the 
simulated area around 
the interrogator being 
tested. 
3.7.2 
· 
SSRlIFF 
interrogator 
challenge 
generation timing 
requirements. 
· 
SSRlIFF 
interrogator 
performance 
requirements. 
· 
SSRlIFF 
interrogator/ICC 
interface 
requirements. 
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User Description Derived Relevant Aspects 
Requirement Requirement 
Section Sectlon(s) 
3.9.1 & 3.10.2 Azimuth and range of 
emulated targets are 
conftgurable for the 
creation of FRUIT and 
garbling scenarios. 
3.B.2 
-
ICC timing 
requirements. 
-
ICC performance 
requirements. 
2.1.10 Antenna Interface 3.10.2 Antenna interface and 
simulation. 
2.2 HW Requirements 3.14 Input/output pins 
available for 
-
Receiving 
challenges from the 
interrogator being 
lested and the 
antenna. 
- Combined replies 
from the system to 
the interrogator 
being tested. 
2.3 Requirements for Future Use 3.13 System to provide 
interface point for the 
ITRC. 
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Appendix B : Source Code 
The sections below present the source code CD directory structure and 
contents. 
The folders in the root directory of the CD are: 
• FPGA 
• DSP 
• Simulink 
• System test results images 
B.l FPGA VHDL Code 
Name sa. Type • 
mode/sim,inj 13KB ConfQxation Settings 
FIFO_d.v 6KB MTI veriloQ 
EMIF A.vhd IKB MTI vhdt 
"" FIFO_d.vhd 6KB MTI vhdt 
N JnterrOQator , vhd 6KB MTI vhdt 
INTERRUPTS_C~TROtlER.vhd 1KB MTI vhdt 
interruptSource.vhd 2KB MTI vhdt 
PlnQPO"9. vhd 2KB MTI vhdt 
pulsesEval .vhd 2SKB MTI vhdt 
ReplyDelayXilinx. vhd 10 K8 MTI vhdl 
VH ReplyGen. vhd 14 KB MTI vhdl 
VH SlFreplyTrio;!, vhd 2KB MTI vhdt 
v T oplevel, vhd 59KB MTI vhdl 
VH TxPtop ,vhd 8KB MTIvhdt 
Figure 7.1 : FPGA subdirectory. VHDL files for the FPGA simulation and 
implementation 
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B.2 DSP C Code 
Name Size Type • 
[) vectors. asm HII ASM F4e 
I!l DlLUT.c 2HII (Flo 
I!l DIITmerl.c 11(11 (Fie 
I!l DllVideoProcessJ:lg .c HII (Fie 
I!l 05P _main . c ZKII (Flo 
I!l PhyEMIF.c 2KB (File 
I!l PhyFPGA. c SKB (File 
I!l PhyGPIO.c 3KB (File 
~ PhyInterrupts .c 31(11 (File 
I!l PhyTimerl.c 41(11 ( Fie 
I!l Boord.h 11(11 HFIo 
I!l (64 I6Re<;listerOefs.h 91(11 HFie 
I!l Oefs.h 31(11 HFie 
I!l DIlUT.h 21(11 HFie 
I!l DGTimerl.h 11(11 HFie 
o DllVideoProcessJ:lg.h 11(11 HFie 
o PhyEMIF.h I KB HFie 
I!l PhyFPGA.h I KB HFie 
I!l PhyFPGARegisters.h 71(11 HFie 
I!l PhyGPIO.h 11(11 HFie 
I!l Phylnterrupts .h IKB HFiIe 
I!l PhyTimerl.h IKB HFiIe 
~DSP _Debuo.cmd 2KB Windows NT (amm ... 
Figure 7.2 : DSP subdirectory. C source code, interrupt vector fi le and the memory 
command file. 
B.3 Matlab/Simulink Models 
Nomo 
I!l pUse£vol.md 
I!l TxpTCC_YI()l_Test.md 
I!l TxP.md 
Size Type .A. 
28S KB _Model 
907 KB _ Model 
185 KB _ Model 
Figure 7 .3 : Simulink subdirectory. Simulink co-simulation and TxP implementation 
models. 
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8 .4 High Resolution System Test Results Images 
..... . ",. Typo 
lij-,.e6 .... ~ 
" " 
PNGImaoe I!l"",. ' .5."", 35" PNGImaoe 
[!) fI9Je 6.6.~ 311(8 PNG Imaoe 
[!)FiQl.re 6.7.~ I'" PNG lmaoe 
l!1 f19Je 6.8.~ 27KB PNG lmaoe 
I!l fI9Je 6.9.pno 261(8 PNGlmaoe 
~FiQlJ'e 6. I O.p!'1Q 17KB PNG 1maoe 
I!lFiQlJ'e 6. II .pno 10 K8 PNG lmaoe 
~fI9Je 6. 12.pnc;j 26" PNG lmaoe 
~f9xe6. 1 3.pno 21 KB PNG lmaoe 
.. FiQlJ'e 6.15.pno .. S .. KB PNG lmaoe 
~""'. ' . 16 ."", '105 " PNG lmaoe 
.. FiQlJ'e 6.18.pnc;j 427KB PNG1maoe 
'" FiIp"e 6.21.pno 83B" PNG lmaoe ~""'. '.22."", .. 21 KB PNG Imaoe 
... FlQu'e 6.23 .~ 
650 " PNG Imaoe 
.. Flgl.xe 6.24.pno 
"''' 
PNG lmaoe 
~FIQu'e 6 .2S.pno 
." PNG lmaoe 
Figure 7.4 : System test results images subdirectory. 
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